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ABSTRACT 
Whether through legal assault, private manumissions or slave revolt, the institution of slavery 
weathered sustained and substantial blows throughout the era spanning the American Revolution 
and Constitutional Era. The tumult of the rebellion against the British, the inspiration of 
Enlightenment ideals and the evolution of the American economy combined to weaken slavery as 
the delegates converged on Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Even in the 
South, it was not hard to find prominent individuals working, speaking or writing against slavery. 
During the Convention, however, Northern delegates capitulated to staunch Southern advocates of 
slavery not because of philosophical misgivings but because of economic considerations. Delegates 
from North and South looked with anticipation toward the nation’s expansion into the Southwest, 
confident it would occasion a slavery-based economic boom. Consequently, the institution of slavery 
was given room to thrive in ways that would take decades and a devastating war to overcome. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The year was 1786, and the horizon shimmered with heady possibilities for the youngest 
nation on earth. In the prior decade, American rebels had overcome daunting odds to best Britain 
on the battlefield, championing the causes of liberty and rights in ways that stirred the Western 
world. The United States had won independence, formed a sovereign government and adopted the 
set of laws that would see it through not only the Revolutionary War but the nation’s infancy. 
Ambitious from the start, America’s dreams knew no bounds. The new nation laid claim to 
more land than the sum of England, France and Spain. Its multifaceted economy – boasting the 
North’s forests and fisheries, alongside lucrative cash crops like tobacco and indigo in the South – 
teemed with potential. Buoyed by glorious ideals such as equality and natural rights, America looked 
to the unknowns of the future with justifiable optimism.    
Unanimity, however, was not in the offing. Americans were hardly on one accord, as the 
populace, four million and growing daily, was riven by varying views on matters both political and 
economic. The colonial period had bred manifold philosophies among the populace in terms of 
distribution of power between federal and state governments, and there was no articulated 
consensus as to what place Native Americans and immigrants would have in the new nation. But no 
issue occasioned more impassioned or more impactful views than did slavery, as white Americans’ 
perspectives were disparately shaped by geography, religion, station in life and personal experiences. 
The Carolinian subsistence farmer, the Connecticut shipping baron and everyone in between had 
strong opinions and a personal stake in the plight of nearly 700,000 enslaved Americans. In an April 
1786 letter to a close friend, one founding father weighed in decisively on slavery.  
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“I can only say that there is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a 
plan adopted for the abolition of it,” he wrote. “(T)here is only one proper and effectual mode by 
which it can be accomplished, and that is by Legislative authority.”1  
These words came not from the quill of a second-tier statesman, nor a milquetoast who 
shrank diffidently into the corner while the Madisons and Jeffersons commanded the spotlight. 
This was a statement of principle by George Washington, the man so widely respected that 
he was chosen unanimously to become the nation’s first president and has been regarded henceforth 
as the Father of the Country. His election took place a little more than a year after 40-odd delegates 
left the Pennsylvania State House in Philadelphia having spent four intense months wrangling, 
debating and writing the United States Constitution. 
At the Constitutional Convention, over half of the delegates did not own slaves. There were 
many Framers who had criticized the institution in public speeches, published essays and private 
correspondence. Some had freed their own slaves. Eleven delegations came from states that had 
banned the importation of slaves.2 Five states already had approved immediate or gradual 
emancipation, in addition to the outright prohibition enacted by the Northwest Ordinance on the 
western frontier. Slavery’s hold on the new nation was weakening, owing to blows from south to 
north, from abolitionists and even from slaveholders. 
Voices like Washington’s were strong, gaining momentum throughout the country. They 
were not quite strong enough to prevent the United States from its original sin: its birth as a slave 
nation. Soon after independence, however, the ambition of expansion locked the nation into 
dependency on Southern plantation agriculture, which crippled the effectiveness of the abolition 
movement for decades to come.  
                                                 
1 George Washington, “Letter from George Washington to Robert Morris, 12 April 1786,” National Archives, 
Founders Online, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0019 (accessed June 30, 2014). 
2 David O. Stewart, Summer of 1787 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 195. 
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2 AMID THE TURBULENCE: BLACK UPHEAVAL DURING THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION     
 
No matter the time, place or circumstance, wars are rife with instability, uncertainty, gravity. 
The American Revolution, pitting a globe-spanning empire against an upstart band of colonists, was 
no exception. At stake – from the colonists’ perspective, anyway – was everything. As for Britain, 
hoping to retain its overseas colony and surprised in many quarters that the colonists even sought to 
fight, it was like any other nation at war in its willingness to take whatever measures necessary to 
prevail. 
 When the Revolution began in April 1775, conventional wisdom suggested the 
British would quell the rebellion without much trouble. They were a far wealthier nation, boasted a 
populace several times larger than that of the 13 colonies and commanded an amphibious military 
that far outstripped the Americans’ in terms of size, arms and experience among leadership and 
rank-and-file alike. Lacking war materiel as rudimentary as uniforms for many troops, the forces 
arrayed under General George Washington had no navy to speak of; they needed French help to be 
able to take the war to the sea to any degree at all. Patriots opposing the British knew that perhaps 
20 to 30 percent of their fellow colonists did not support the rebellion. Still, there was at least one 
sign that the global superpower did not think victory a fait accompli. Britain, after all, did not 
become a juggernaut by lacking an understanding of how to win wars. So it was during the nascent 
stage of the armed conflict that Britain would enact the first large-scale emancipation of slaves in the 
American colonies. 
On Nov. 7, 1775, fewer than seven months after the first shots fired at Lexington and 
Concord, John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore and royal governor of Virginia, responded to a string 
of small-scale acts of rebellion by issuing an edict that granted freedom to any enslaved people 
4 
joining the British side: “I do hereby farther declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or others 
(appertaining to Rebels) free, that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining his Majesty’s 
Troops, as soon as may be.”3 The Dunmore Proclamation - issued from aboard a ship in Norfolk’s 
harbor, since its author in June had fled Williamsburg for safety – established martial law and 
inflamed the antipathy toward the government. “The colonists were struck with horror,” a 
contemporary wrote.4 To a populace already chafing against British rule, forced emancipation of 
their slaves was perceived as an egregious affront to white colonists’ liberty.  
Virginians immediately reinforced slave patrols and monitored likely escape routes, in 
addition to mounting a public awareness campaign. Newspapers repeatedly published the 
proclamation in newspapers and attempted to minimize escape or insurrection by exhorting whites 
to tell slaves Dunmore’s offer was not all it was cracked up to be – that runaways would be 
mistreated or sold off by the British.5 George Washington, named commander of the Continental 
Army in June 1775, agreed that Dunmore’s plan was ill-conceived but was clearly nervous. Writing 
to Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia neighbor and delegate in the First Continental Congress, 
Washington predicted that Dunmore’s strength would increase like a rolling snowball and that the 
British leader would “become the most formidable enemy America has6... if some expedient cannot 
be hit upon to convince the slaves and servants of the impotency of his designs.”7 Defeating 
Dunmore militarily was not the only objective on Washington’s agenda. In the same letter of 
                                                 
3 John Murray. “Dunmore Proclamation,” November 7, 1775. 
http://memory.loc.gov/rbc/rbpe/rbpe17/rbpe178/17801800/001dr.jpg (accessed July 2, 2014). 
4 David Ramsay, History of the American Revolution (Philadelphia, 1789) 234. 
5 Benjamin Quarles, "Lord Dunmore as Liberator," The William and Mary Quarterly 15: 498. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2936904 (accessed July 3, 2014). 
6 Author’s emphasis. 
7 George Washington, “From George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, 26 December 1775,” National 
Archives, Founders Online, 
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=%22richard%20henry%20lee%22%20impotency&s=1111311111&sa=&r=1&sr= 
(accessed June 30, 2014). 
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December 26, 1775, he advised Lee that “(n)othing less than depriving (Dunmore) of life or liberty 
will secure peace to Virginia.”8  
Despite deterrent efforts from the highest levels of American leadership on down, an 
estimated 800 slaves were brave enough to join what was called Lord Dunmore’s Ethiopian 
Regiment before the governor, accurately perceiving the threat to his own safety, fled the colony in 
early 1776.9 These former captives were outfitted with military uniforms (with “Liberty to Slaves” 
boldly stitched across the chest), given arms and ordered to use them defensively and offensively.10 
Dunmore’s edict stirred a strong response in slaves, many of whom were captured or killed before 
reaching him, and in white Americans. At least one enslaved woman named her child in honor of 
Dunmore.11 In those years of unpredictability, when it was not yet clear that the world would be 
turned upside down, the Dunmore Proclamation was among many developments contributing to 
the volatility of the American colonies. 
 In July 1775, four months prior to the Dunmore Proclamation, Benjamin Franklin had 
written to a British friend that Dunmore and his North Carolinian counterpart, Governor Josiah 
Martin, had been provoking slave insurrections. This was no baseless claim, as the British were keen 
to do exactly that. Martin had attested one month earlier in a letter to the Earl of Dartmouth that 
the presence of vast numbers of slaves in Virginia and Maryland harbored the potential for 
weakening colonial strength.12 To be sure, provoking slave insurrection made perfect sense as 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Benjamin Quarles, "Lord Dunmore as Liberator," The William and Mary Quarterly 15 (1958): 506, accessed July 
3, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2936904 (accessed July 3, 2014). 
10 James W. St. G. Walker, "Blacks as American Loyalists: The Slaves' War for Independence," Historical 
Reflections 2 (1975): 54, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41298659. 
11 Judith Van Buskirk, "Crossing the Lines: African-Americans in the New York City Region during the British 
Occupation, 1776-1783," Pennsylvania History 65 (1998): 78, accessed July 8, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27774162. 
12 Quarles, “Lord Dunmore as Liberator,” 496n. 
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counterrevolutionary wartime stratagem. Rather than representing a moral stand or a commitment 
to end slavery, which Britain would not do until 1833, it was a means to a military end.13 
To the extent that Britain could actuate slave rebellions, the colonists’ attention would be 
diverted. Their focus and energies would be consumed with priorities other than defeat of the 
colonial power. It was quite possible that responding to slave rebellions could have dampened the 
colonists’ passion for fighting the British; slaveowners would be compelled to stay close to home to 
protect their families from slaves on the lam. The British had good reason to hope that the prospect 
of tens or hundreds of thousands of slaves fleeing the plantation would be perceived by Patriots as 
“a powerful incentive for the speedy restoration of peace and loyalty” to avoid devastation to the 
southern economy and the formation of a threat to whites’ safety.14 
In the view of George William Van Cleve, the Patriots’ motivations regarding slavery were 
not limited to stanching the flow of runaways. Van Cleve has suggested that white Americans 
alarmed by threats to slavery in Britain foresaw threats to the institution in the colonies.15 Rendered 
in 1772 by celebrated British jurist Lord Mansfield, the Somerset v. Stewart ruling mandated that 
slavery, where it existed, be permitted by explicit law rather than de facto understanding or tradition. 
If this legal precedent were to cross the Atlantic, the defenders of slavery would have an even harder 
time protecting the institution against the mounting campaign of American abolitionists, who began 
citing the Somerset ruling in lawsuits and petitions seeking freedom for enslaved blacks. For this 
reason, as Sylvia Frey has suggested, Southerners were particularly motivated to defeat the British, 
                                                 
13 The British unleashed a similar stratagem while fighting the United States in the War of 1812, offering 
freedom to any slaves who materialized before them. 
14 Walker, “Blacks as American Loyalists,” 60. 
15 George William Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics and the Constitution in the 
Early Republic. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
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which broadened the intensity of a rebellion whose kindling emanated mostly from the North. In 
the South, she argues, it was “a war about slavery, if not a war over slavery.”16 
As the Revolutionary War proceeded, the British gave both northern and southern colonists 
more occasion to reckon with the prospect of slaves on the loose. The Dunmore Proclamation was 
followed by a much bolder step in June 1779.  Henry Clinton, commander of the British forces, 
declared the freedom of all slaves held by Patriots. Unlike Dunmore’s edict, Clinton’s included only 
one contingency – that the slaves make their way across British lines. This required no military 
obligation and applied not just to men, who could subsequently take up arms against the Americans, 
but also to women and children. The broader terms in what came to be known as the Philipsburg 
Proclamation - Clinton had issued his declaration from the Philipsburg Manor just north of New 
York City – spurred much broader results. Several tens of thousands of slaves found safe haven with 
the British during the war, setting the stage for, among other things, tricky negotiations during the 
Treaty of Paris at war’s end.17 Clinton suggested later in the conflict that blacks would be given land 
taken from defeated American Patriots, in a foreshadowing of the Radical Republicans’ efforts to 
redistribute Confederate lands to freedmen after the Civil War some 80 years later. 
Some slaves managed to flee to the relatively safe environs of Canada or Florida, or even 
Jamaica, which as a slave colony would have harbored a considerable degree of insecurity for 
fugitives. The strategy of fleeing far from home was often the highest priority, in some cases 
trumping concerns about the racial climate in a given destination. While precise numbers are not 
possible to ascertain, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were among the colonies with the 
                                                 
16 Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 45. 
17 Walker, “Blacks as American Loyalists,” 55n. 
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highest rates of escape.18 The prevalence of escape in these colonies offered proof that runaways 
generally thought themselves safest in areas that already had a substantial number of freed blacks; it 
was less conspicuous for them to be moving about town unaccompanied by whites. In areas with 
water access, the opportunity for escape was enhanced by whites who abetted slaves’ passage onto 
ships.19 Even prior to the Revolution, colonial governments routinely responded to escapes and 
rebellions with tighter restrictions and stiffer punishments for those who violated them. By the late 
18th century, it was evident that uprisings of the enslaved had no equal in terms of their capacity to 
consume the hearts and minds of white America. 
 Though documentation and evidence of slave rebellions are largely unavailable, there were a 
number of events prominent enough to register conspicuously in the historical record – and in the 
consciousness of eighteenth-century white America. Chief among these was the Stono Rebellion. In 
September 1739, an enslaved South Carolinian alternately referred to as Jemmy or Cato led 
somewhere between 60 to 80 slaves as they headed along the Stono River toward Spanish Florida, 
where the imperial government had, via several laws promulgated over the course of more than a 
century, promised freedom to blacks who fled British America. The Stono runaways killed 21 whites 
before being stopped by a group of an estimated 100 whites led by South Carolina Lieutenant 
Governor William Bull. The death toll of blacks, including summary executions upon capture, 
reached 40 to 50 within a week’s time.20 
South Carolina’s response was quick and severe. It was only a matter of months before its 
colonial legislature passed “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other 
Slaves in this Province,” also known as the Negro Act of 1740. This edict, which approaches 10,000 
                                                 
18 Nash, Race and Revolution, 60-61. 
19 Van Buskirk, "Crossing the Lines,” 90-1. 
20 Joel S. Berson, "How the Stono Rebels Learned of Britain's War With Spain," The South Carolina Historical 
Magazine 110 (2009): 54, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40646897. 
9 
words in length and is more than double the length of the United States Constitution, stiffened the 
punishments against slave lawbreakers and made it illegal for slaves to earn money, assemble in 
groups without white supervision, grow food for themselves and a host of other actions.21 To ensure 
whites’ compliance, teaching slaves to write was made punishable by a fine of ₤100, an enormous 
sum at the time. Perhaps counterintuitively, the law also mandated that slaves be given adequate 
clothing and Sundays off, so as to effect more humane treatment and thereby reduce the supposed 
motivation for rebellion. 
Additional fallout came the same year, when James Oglethorpe, Georgia’s colonial governor, 
ordered an invasion of Florida in which British soldiers and Indian allies stormed the capital of St. 
Augustine and swiftly captured Fort Mose. Two years earlier, Fort Mose had been established as a 
haven for runaway slaves, mostly from South Carolina. It was no accident that Mose was targeted by 
Oglethorpe; the presence of free blacks near the Georgia-Florida border not only represented a 
potential outlet for more slave escapes but also fostered circumstances likely to lead to slave 
rebellion. The free blacks of Fort Mose also could have crossed the border to stage a raid to liberate 
slaves. 
White residents often encountered triggers for their fear of slave rebellion. A lurid Virginia 
Gazette article of January 25, 1770, was typical of newspaper reports that provoked terror among 
white residents. Rich with detail, it described the violence and brutality of a small slave revolt 
occasioned by a slave’s tardiness in lighting the morning fire at Bowler Cocke’s planation in Hanover 
County, Va.22 The nearly 500-word chronicle included details about the types of weapons the slaves 
used, graphic descriptions of some individuals’ injuries and the measures that were necessary to quell 
                                                 
21 Darold D. Wax, “`The Great Risque We Run’: The Aftermath of Slave Rebellion at Stono, South Carolina, 
1739-1745," The Journal of Negro History 67 (1982): 139, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41298659. 
22 William Rind, The Virginia Gazette, January 25, 1770. 
10 
the attack. This sort of account, often featured in the same publications where runaway-slave 
bulletins were printed, would have provided for white readers an effective means to consider slave 
revolts not as abstractions but as events that were terrifyingly feasible. Dating back to the first 
decades of the 18th century, slave insurrections as far away as the Caribbean were frequently reported 
in American newspapers.23 Despite an utter lack of unbiased or broad sourcing - reportage on slave 
rebellions relied overwhelmingly on information provided by slaveholding whites – such articles 
were unrivaled in informing whites’ mindset and stoking their fright. 
The North, despite having far fewer slaves than the South, also was marked by the threat of 
insurrection in the colonial period. Although uprisings took place throughout the region, New York, 
which was home to more enslaved and free blacks than any other northern state, likely experienced 
this threat to a greater extent. In 1741, influential whites in New York City yielded to fear that had 
been percolating for decades and alleged a conspiracy among blacks to burn down the city. A 
number of whites also were implicated as having helped to plan and organize the would-be rebellion. 
Massive panic led to mass arrests and, despite a startling lack of conclusive evidence, to the 
execution of 31 blacks and the exile from North America of dozens more.24  
This occurred at a time when many New Yorkers would have been able to recall similarly 
incendiary events that took place nearby. Long Island, just east of Manhattan, was the 1708 site of 
one of the earliest recorded slave revolts in America. And in 1712, New York was laced with fear 
when a group of slaves – estimates range from 20 to double or triple that – set fire to a Manhattan 
building and violently set upon whites who had gone to the scene to extinguish the blaze. Nine 
whites were killed, six were wounded. After militia units were called from the surrounding area, 
                                                 
23 Eric W. Plaag, “New York's 1741 Slave Conspiracy in a Climate of Fear and Anxiety," New York History 84 
(2003): 289, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23183369. 
24 For an excellent account of the formation and repercussions of the conspiracy theories, see Jill Lepore’s New 
York Burning: Liberty, Slavery, and Conspiracy in Eighteenth-Century Manhattan (New York: Random House, 2005). 
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some seventy blacks were arrested in the aftermath of the incident, with 21 ultimately being executed 
and another six committing suicide.25 This led to the enactment of heightened restrictions and 
potential punishments regarding blacks both free and enslaved. Blacks were forbidden to own land, 
gather in numbers exceeding three and travel at night without a lantern. Whites who manumitted 
their slaves would have to pay an exorbitant tax of ₤200, a formidable deterrent to emancipation-
minded owners. Neighboring New Jersey also was the site of several prominent slave uprisings in 
the first half of the 18th century. 
There were other reasons why slave uprisings may have been especially common in New 
York. First, it was a cosmopolitan city, with its bustling ports, newspapers, excellent access to 
waterways and proximity to other population centers such as Boston and Philadelphia. This made it 
possible for New Yorkers to keep abreast of news and events happening elsewhere. Even if most 
black slaves could not read, they heard a great deal of news and helped spread it themselves. In the 
frenzy of accusations and testimony related to the 1741 conspiracy, the city’s population density and 
tightly woven social network would have helped to substantiate historian Jill Lepore’s assertion that 
“it seems altogether possible that every black man in New York knew every other black man in the 
city.” Objectively speaking, about 200 of the city’s roughly 450 black men, an astonishing 
proportion, were linked in some manner to the 1741 conspiracy.26 This was a town where ideas 
spread easily among both whites and blacks. 
An environment ripe for the diffusion of ideas was perfect for George Whitefield. 
Whitefield, an English-born preacher, visited the American colonies seven times from 1738-1769 
and became the most impactful figure in the Great Awakening with his ability to command the 
                                                 
25 Robert Hunter to the Lords of Trade, June 23, 1712, in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of 
New York. ed. E.B. O’Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1850), 342. 
26 Jill Lepore, New York Burning: Liberty, Slavery, and Conspiracy in Eighteenth-Century Manhattan (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2005), 151-152. 
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attention of upwards of six or eight thousand people at open-air sermons and revivals. His audiences 
were both white and black. Credited with sparking enthusiasm among adherents and winning 
converts to boot, Whitefield was in a position to wield broad influence on the issue of slavery. And 
like so many whites in the land where he made his mark, he was deeply ambivalent.  While he 
excoriated masters for their harsh treatment of slaves, he also helped bring slavery into Georgia by 
cogently arguing that the colony could not survive without it.27 Traversing the colonies to deliver 
sermons, Whitefield was so afraid of insurrectionist slaves that he recorded in his diary multiple 
occasions on which he and his traveling party altered their route through the countryside so as to 
lessen the likelihood of encountering that particular perceived danger.28  
These very fears may have given rise to a controversial dimension of Whitefield’s impact on 
the colonies. Having completed a yearlong tour of the colonies, Whitefield had personal experiences 
to draw upon as he wrote a 1740 essay entitled "Inhabitants of Maryland, Virginia, North and South-
Carolina concerning the treatment of their Negroes." This tract was published by his friend 
Benjamin Franklin, yet another prominent figure with a mixed record on slavery. Whitefield’s essay 
shamed masters for treating their slaves cruelly and denying them the religious exposure that he 
thought would help make them into better slaves. He went so far as to say revolts were God’s 
punishment for the harshness with which masters treated their slaves, a stance that evoked reverence 
from some black contemporaries and anger from many whites. 29 One year after the Stono Rebellion 
and one year before the New York Conspiracy of 1741, Whitefield provoked the most controversy 
with a passage that seemed to justify insurrection: “I have wondered, that we have not more 
                                                 
27 Alfred O. Aldridge, "George Whitefield's Georgia Controversies," The Journal of Southern History 9 (1943): 
361, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2191321. 
28 Stephen J. Stein, "George Whitefield on Slavery: Some New Evidence," Church History 42 (1973): 247, 
accessed July 5, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3163671. 
29 Lepore, New York Burning, 188. The pioneering African-American poetess Phillis Wheatley wrote An Elegiac 
Poem, On the Death of that Celebrated Divine, and Eminent Servant of Jesus Christ, the Late Reverend, and Pious George Whitefield, her 
publishing debut that elicited considerable commendation in both America and England. 
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Instances of Self-Murder among the Negroes, or that they have not more frequently rose up in 
Arms against their Owners.”30  Himself a slaveowner late in life, Whitefield typified whites’ 
ambivalence about the institution, but he made clear his awareness of the danger of uprisings. 
Whitefield was not the only English-born observer of American folkways to comment on 
slave insurrections. Amid the dawning of the American Revolution, few voices were heard more 
loudly than that of Thomas Paine. Paine’s most well-known arguments in his Common Sense pamphlet 
revolved around the way the colonies no longer needed Britain and could prosper without it. First 
published to great acclaim in the winter of 1775-76, Common Sense helped kindle the fire of rebellion 
among untold legions of colonists; furthermore, as attested by John Adams, who was on foreign 
assignment for the fledgling government, the pamphlet “was received in France and in all Europe 
with rapture” for its advocacy of American sovereignty and the virtues of republicanism.31 But amid 
Paine’s political and philosophical salvoes was an allusion to the insufferable prospect of slave 
revolt. Paine denounced the British government as "that barbarous and hellish power, which hath 
stirred up the Indians and Negroes to destroy us."32   
Paine was not speaking as a slaveowner. To the contrary, he was on the vanguard of anti-
slavery discourse in colonial America. His groundbreaking “African Slavery in America,” published 
March 8, 1775, as his first publication in America since emigrating from Britain, loosed a sharp 
critique of the institution of slavery, labeling it “monstrous” and issuing a call for the development 
of emancipation plans.33 One month later, Paine joined French-born firebrand Anthony Benezet and 
a Quaker-led contingent of Philadelphians as founding members of the Society for the Relief of Free 
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Negroes Unlawfully Held in Bondage, the first anti-slavery society in the Americas. Still, despite the 
words and deeds of Paine’s that criticized the totality of slavery, the prospect of slave insurrection 
frightened him just as it did many other whites. 
◦     ◦     ◦ 
The Revolution was a formidable agent of change for blacks both enslaved and free. One of 
the biggest reasons for this was the tens of thousands of Americans who were engaged in the theater 
of war at any given time. A substantial percentage of these were slaveowners whose slaves were 
either left unguarded or kept under alternative arrangements - by the absent soldier’s kin, for 
example. And perhaps most significantly, the Dunmore and Philipsburg Proclamations formalized 
and accelerated a timeless feature of slave regimes: escape. While the Revolution was waged to effect 
freedom for whites, an unintended consequence was what Gary Nash terms “the largest slave 
uprising in our history”34      
The British proclamations, coupled with the inherent instability of war and the inspiration of 
the colonists’ fight for freedom, combined to spur an unprecedented wave of self-emancipation. 
Thomas Jefferson estimated that 30,000 slaves fled their masters in Virginia alone during the 
British’s 1781 invasion of that colony, which had America’s largest slave population. Excluding 
those for whom escape was not feasible – the young, the old, the infirm, mothers of young children 
– this translates into an astonishing escape rate of approximately 50 percent of those who were in a 
reasonable position to do so.35 Although Virginia’s rate likely exceeded the norm for other colonies, 
slave escapes were a quantifiably significant feature of the wartime landscape. 
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Gaining freedom was not the only change blacks experienced during the war. Some slaves-
turned-soldiers modified diminutive names they had been given – turning Jem, for example, into 
James – or adopted last names denied them while in bondage. At times, they chose surnames based 
on their trade skills, such as Sawyer or Cooper, or based on the heady circumstances in which they 
found themselves. Of the 289 men identified as black in the Connecticut army, 23 reported 
`Liberty’, `Freedom’ or `Freeman’ as their last name.36 Gaining a last name, to say nothing of 
deliberately choosing one with particular meaning, could be a powerful step for a former slave to 
influence the way others saw him. 
Some of those who did not escape, while perhaps paralyzed by the danger and uncertainty 
that fleeing entailed, still managed to capitalize on the protean landscape of war. These 
circumstances, to use Frey’s term, spawned nothing short of “racial anarchy.”37 Some blacks took 
advantage of a less restrictive environment by reconfiguring plantation life more to their liking – 
altering work schedules, for example.38 Some slaves found themselves with newfound leverage. 
Masters in British-occupied areas who did not want to be revealed as abettors to the Patriot army 
had to ensure their slaves did not divulge what could have been construed as incriminating 
evidence.39 For individuals ensnared in bondage, this position of power in relation to their masters 
would have been somewhat of a revelation. Further, court records reveal that some slaves gave 
themselves surnames during the war, perhaps empowered in their own way by the revolutionary 
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spirit.40 This would have been a significant step for the slaves’ identity and concept of self even if 
many whites continued to refer to the slave only by his or her first name. 
Aside from those who escaped bondage and filtered into free society, the blacks most 
affected by the Revolutionary War were those who joined the fight. Some individuals enlisted in the 
Continental Army; others sided with the British. And while a substantial proportion of black soldiers 
played support roles – serving as blacksmiths, carpenters, cooks, and, given their knowledge of the 
terrain, especially as guides – a large number held combat positions.41 As for Loyalist blacks, many of 
whom had been enticed by the Dunmore and Philipsburg Proclamations, the majority found 
employment with British families or officers. Yet a substantial number ended up with a rifle on their 
shoulder; there were 1,500 soldiers in the British ranks as of July 1780.42 This was less a verdict on 
blacks’ motherland-versus-colony philosophical stance than a calculated decision to cast one’s lot 
with the side that had pledged to provide passage into freedom. On that basis alone, blacks’ support 
of the British made abundant sense. 
But while black soldiers had a considerable presence in the British army, a greater number 
fought for the Continental Army, and the vast majority did so in integrated units. A handful of 
notable achievements stand out. An ex-slave named Peter Salem, granted his freedom in exchange 
for his enlistment, is credited with killing British Major John Pitcairn at the Battle of Bunker Hill. 43 
Another former slave, Salem Poor, bought his freedom in 1769 and went on to fight at Saratoga and 
Monmouth, in addition to being stationed with General Washington at Valley Forge. It was Poor’s 
actions at Bunker Hill, above all, that led 14 officers to submit his name for commendation to the 
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Continental Congress.44 Further distinction went to the 1st Rhode Island Regiment, which with 
Washington’s sanction was exclusively comprised of black soldiers for a time during the war. These 
were signs that the humanity, contributions and worth of free blacks were valued – and not just in 
any arena, but where it mattered most. It is substantially inaccurate to paint Revolutionary-era 
America as a place where the social hierarchy was so rigid that respect for blacks did not exist and 
opportunities for blacks were uniformly circumscribed by white racism. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy wartime service was tendered by James Armistead, who served 
under famed French officer Marquis de Lafayette as one of the first double agents in American 
history and a presumed beneficiary of the Dunmore Proclamation. Armistead infiltrated the British 
camp and convinced British officers he was a runaway, whereupon the officers promptly decided to 
utilize him as a spy and send him back to the American side. Having ingratiated himself with other 
in-the-know blacks in the British camp, Armistead was then able to deliver vital information about 
British tactics and troop movements to Lafayette, who used Armistead’s intelligence to coordinate 
with Washington in laying siege to Yorktown and ultimately forcing surrender in what is considered 
the last major battle of the Revolutionary War. Armistead’s heroics were noted by Lafayette, whose 
surname Armistead adopted after Lafayette recognized his contributions by successfully petitioning 
the Virginia General Assembly for his freedom.45  
That Armistead was granted his freedom, albeit after multiple fruitless attempts, indicates 
that even in Virginia the commitment of whites to the slave system was not as intransigent as is 
often suggested. That state’s General Assembly enacted a law in 1783 freeing blacks who had served 
in the Revolutionary War; one of its clauses specifically targeted slaveowners attempting to return 
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veteran blacks to servitude.46 This law was passed a year after Virginia re-authorized private 
manumission after it had been banned for a half-century. Around this same time, Lafayette, whose 
relationship with Washington approximated that of a father and a son, suggested to the General that 
all of Virginia’s slaves be emancipated. Lafayette theorized that they could be resettled in the western 
part of the state as “tenant farmers.”47 This would presage later plans for colonization, which 
entailed resettling blacks somewhere outside the United States.48 After the war Lafayette continued 
to press Washington. Various correspondence between the two men in 1786 revealed the 
Frenchman’s ardor for attacking the institution of slavery. Lafayette told Washington he had bought 
a plantation in French Guiana where he intended to turn slaves into paid laborers, a proposition 
Lafayette yearned to implement throughout the United States. Washington lavishly praised his friend 
and revealed that he shared his antipathy for slavery: “Would to God a like spirit would diffuse itself 
generally into the minds of the people of this country.”49 
As pioneering African-American history scholar W.B. Hartgrove has shown, fixing the exact 
number of blacks who served in the Revolutionary War is a formidable task. First, there was the 
ephemeral nature of service in the war, whether regarding blacks or whites. Individuals came and 
went frequently - sometimes rejoining the same regiment, and other times, a different one. They 
were pushed and pulled by family concerns, homesickness, fluctuating motivations and financial 
issues such as Congress’ inability to honor consistently its promises to compensate soldiers. In 
keeping up with this transience, records were less than precise. 
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Beyond all of these issues, which affected troops of every racial background, additional 
complications made it particularly difficult to document the participation of black soldiers. Most 
significantly, records kept for each regiment didn’t always identify which soldiers were black. Amid 
these challenges, historian W.B. Hartgrove combed through a trove of state records, rosters and 
requisitions and concluded that there were “at least 4,000 Negro soldiers” who fought for the 
Patriots, scattered throughout the regulars and militias from all 13 states.50 Some historians put the 
number around 5,000. No matter the precise number, black soldiers formed enough of a critical 
mass that Americans, British and Hessians often referenced them in wartime correspondence.  
As with any group of soldiers, most black soldiers in the Revolutionary War carried out their 
duties without leaving a substantial mark on the historical record. More is known about the battle 
over whether to allow them to serve. Massachusetts, as was often the case, led the way.51 Its initial 
salvo in this debate occurred in May 1775, just a month after Lexington and Concord, when the 
state legislature’s Committee of Safety responded to a petition from freeman Prince Hall and others 
by granting that free blacks could serve, while forbidding the enlistment of enslaved people.52 In 
June of that year, blacks such as Salem and Poor went on to serve with distinction in the colony’s 
militia at the Battle of Bunker Hill. 
The issue’s importance was such that the federal government was compelled to address it 
immediately, with varying outcomes. In September of 1775, South Carolina’s Edward Rutledge 
introduced a proposal before the Continental Congress that all black soldiers would be discharged 
immediately. The proposal failed, but was followed on October 8 with two definitive votes. The first 
unanimously moved to dismiss all slaves from the army, and the second was bolder still - a majority 
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vote to expel even free blacks.53 In the last months of 1775, with the Dunmore Proclamation having 
awakened the government to the fearsome prospect of blacks joining the British forces, General 
Washington issued an order that barred most blacks but granted an exception to those who already 
had served. Instead of implementing a blanket policy, Congress followed up by deferring to the 
judgment of each state to do it as it pleased – a notable portent of the federal government’s decades-
long deference to states on the issue of slavery. 
It was clear that the idea of black soldiers was complicated by several factors, strategic and 
otherwise. Both blacks and whites knew this issue had far-reaching repercussions. New Hampshire’s 
William Whipple, a slaveholding member of the Second Continental Congress, averred in 1779 that 
enlisting blacks would yield profound consequences: "It will produce the Emancipation of a number 
of those wretches and lay a foundation for the Abolition of Slavery in America."54 To some, this was 
an intended and deeply desired consequence; to others, the potential ripple effects represented a 
reason to reject the enlistment of blacks. Would blacks be returned to bondage after their service, 
and if so, would they be fit to reacquire a posture of servitude?55 Or would enlistment occasion a 
quid pro quo freeing those who had served? Most critically, was putting weapons in blacks’ hands, 
removing them from bondage and charging them with killing whites, an idea destined to backfire on 
society at large? Perhaps not. As David Brion Davis points out, slaves had been used in warfare for 
centuries in Muslim societies without disrupting the antebellum social order.56 
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Amid the tumult of the Revolution, it was yet to be determined which institutions, traditions 
and ideologies would be left intact if independence were to be attained. Slavery’s status was far from 
settled.  
3 RESISTANCE: ASSAULTS ON SLAVERY FROM SOUTH TO NORTH 
The colonies, like the states immediately following independence, were riven by the slavery 
debate in several forms. Infused with economic, social, religious, moral and practical dimensions, 
this was a battle fought in the halls of colonial legislatures and even within families. Anti-slavery 
currents ran through every region of British North America. 
One momentous chapter of the fight occurred within the wealthy and influential Laurens 
family. In early 1778, South Carolina’s John Laurens exchanged a series of impassioned letters with 
his father, Henry, then the President of the Continental Congress, in which he broached a stunning 
proposition. John Laurens asked to be given his inheritance of 40 slaves early such that he could 
form a regiment with them to fight the British. This was a particularly revolutionary proposal, given 
other developments in the South. In several southern states, white men were offered not only land 
but slaves as bounties for enlistment. Virginia’s 1781 plan came on the heels of a debate in the 
colony’s legislature to redistribute land from wealthy to poor whites.57 This plan, however, was 
adopted but not implemented, and was quite controversial.58 Madison opposed it, rebutting it with 
an idea and ideology similar to Laurens’; enlisting blacks “would certainly be more consonant to the 
principles of liberty, which might never to be lost sight of in a contest for (colonists’) liberty.”59 
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Laurens’ radical proposal illustrates how pressing the need was to recruit men to fight the British, 
and helps explain why he was compelled to champion his extraordinary solution. 
Laurens was an intriguing figure to take up this cause. As the son of a wealthy rice planter 
and prodigious slave trader, he had garnered immense advantages from the slave system by his early 
20s and was assured of benefiting in perpetuity if he continued along his father’s path. But John 
Laurens was a headstrong young man, educated in England and Switzerland, who in 1776 had 
highlighted the hypocrisy of America’s freedom fight: “I think we Americans at least in the Southern 
Colonies, cannot contend with a good Grace, for Liberty, until we shall have enfranchised our 
Slaves.”60 He endorsed the virtues of using lifting up an oppressed people while serving the public 
good by way of military service. Laurens disregarded his father’s forceful opposition, which included 
warnings of the ignominy that would befall his family, and continued to push his military proposal.  
After vehemently rebuffing the idea for months, Henry Laurens reflected on the progression 
of the war – the British had captured Savannah in December 1778 – and acceded to the viability of 
his son’s plan. Henry Laurens, who owned over 250 slaves he never freed and was a longtime 
principal in an enormous slavetrading firm, had been transformed from opponent to supporter of 
this potentially revolutionary proposal. In March 1779, while commissioning John Laurens as a 
Lieutenant Colonel, Congress approved a plan to turn to South Carolina and Georgia for the 
enlistment of 3,000 slaves, who would be requisitioned proportionally according to the size of each 
slaveowner’s holdings.61 Loyal service would entitle the slaves to their freedom and $50 at war’s end, 
provided they relinquished their weapons. This was a radical step away from the way the legislature 
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typically resisted imposing any slave-related policies on states, and it showed once again that support 
for the institution of slavery could be and was in fact mitigated in various ways. 
John Laurens’ idea received the enthusiastic support of close friend Alexander Hamilton, 
who conveyed his advocacy in a letter to John Jay on March 14, 1779. Calling Laurens’s plan “the 
most rational that can be adopted,” Hamilton said he believed blacks had the potential to be 
excellent soldiers, especially given their years of experience in subordination. Good soldiers follow 
orders easily and well, just as he assumed slaves did. In the letter, however, Hamilton was ambivalent 
on blacks’ mental capacities. He attributed their lack of intellectual development not to inherent 
shortcomings but to the stultifying nature of their servitude - “their natural faculties are as good as 
ours,” he wrote.62 Furthermore, in a moment of pragmatism that was somewhat at odds with his 
usual fierce stands on principle, Hamilton correctly reasoned that the British would make use of 
black troops if the Americans did not. 
Despite the proposal’s influential backers, the ultimate authority on the matter was ceded to 
lightly populated Georgia and South Carolina, whose intransigence regarding slavery would become 
a decisive factor at the Constitutional Convention. Buoyed by the emergent support of his father, 
John Laurens went to great lengths to drum up support for his plan, but he found no quarter in the 
South Carolina legislature. The state’s Vice President, Christopher Gadsden, who had replaced the 
Congress-bound Henry Laurens, said he and his colleagues were “disgusted” by the “very dangerous 
and impolitic” plan John Laurens had introduced.63 The plan was not as radical as it was perceived, 
however, given that slaves had been used throughout the previous half-century to repel attacks on 
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South Carolina by Native Americans and Spaniards.64 The younger Laurens was crestfallen at the 
opposition he encountered - not least because he, like Hamilton, saw the military necessity of 
bolstering the rolls of an army struggling to attract and keep soldiers.  
Laurens was proven right in the most conspicuous way when the British took over 
Charleston on May 12, 1780, forcing the surrender of 5,000 troops, including Laurens himself. It 
was the Patriots’ worst defeat of the war. After Laurens was released, he returned to the South 
Carolina legislature as an elected member of the body, armed with what he felt was a compelling raft 
of evidence that black reinforcements were needed. He tweaked his proposal in early 1782 - by 
which time the tide had turned decisively in favor of the Patriots - such that slaves would be drafted 
only from Loyalists’ holdings.65 Though his audience was in some ways predisposed to agree with 
him – his plan would punish Loyalist opponents, after all – Laurens’ plan again was rejected by the 
General Assembly by what one representative recalled as a margin of 100 to about 15.66 The 
irrepressible Laurens, the most ardent Revolutionary-era supporter of black empowerment in South 
Carolina, was planning to take his crusade to Georgia when, on Aug. 27, 1782, he was killed in 
battle.67 Washington, despite his own misgivings on the issue of slavery, memorialized Laurens as a 
man who “had not a fault that I ever could discover.”68  
Laurens was among many southerners who contradicted the pro-slavery ethos that pervaded 
the region. The first speech Richard Henry Lee delivered after being elected to Virginia’s House of 
Burgesses in 1758 was a call for an end to the slave trade. Lee would go onto propose a 1774 bill 
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that seemed capable of taxing slave importers out of business, but when the House of Burgesses was 
dissolved, the bill could do nothing more than evolve into county-by-county resolutions that 
conveyed an official message. John Adams, who ranks among the first order of Founding Fathers, 
was adamant in his opposition to slavery, a position shared by wife Abigail. Declaration of 
Independence signer Benjamin Harrison V, a political heavyweight who served as governor of 
Virginia from 1781-84, urged heavy taxes and limitations on slave importations as early as 1772.69 
◦     ◦     ◦ 
Even before bullets flew against the British, the fighting spirit of resistance had pervaded 
much of the colonies. Inspired by whites who were asserting a claim for political liberty, several 
groups of slaves wrote petitions for freedom to the state government of Massachusetts in the mid-
1770s. One of them referred to the Spanish system of coratación, in which slaves would earn 
remuneration for their labors and then buy their freedom.70 In November 1779, a group of 19 New 
Hampshire slaves – one of whom, Prince Whipple, belonged to William Whipple of the Continental 
Congress - appealed to that colony’s General Assembly with cogent eloquence. Their stirring plea 
for liberty, which ultimately would be rejected, invoked the principle of natural rights and echoed 
Jefferson and Locke by asserting that “freedom is an inherent right of the human species.”71 In the 
same year, slaves from Fairfield County, Conn., presented the colony’s General Assembly with a 
missive that not only delineated the contradiction of their bondage amid America’s revolutionary 
struggle, but also assailed racism throughout the colonies.72 The hypocrisy of the colonies’ fight for 
freedom was not lost on black Americans, some of whom were able and willing to deploy the power 
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of the written word to further their cause. The colonies were turned upside down by the Revolution, 
and this was a transformation that affected all Americans – white, black, free and enslaved. In 
subsequent years many blacks were loath to relinquish the increased autonomy they experienced 
during the war.73 
Foreshadowing the rhetoric of other early abolitionists, the African-American poetess Phillis 
Wheatley identified the burgeoning double standard in colonial America. Her 1774 letter to 
Reverend Samson Occom, a Connecticut-based Mohegan Indian who was an ordained Presbyterian 
minister, highlighted this contradiction: “How well the Cry for Liberty, and the reverse Disposition 
for the exercise of oppressive Power over others, agree,- I humbly think it does not require the 
Penetration of a Philosopher to determine.”74 Two years before South Carolinian slaveholder John 
Laurens proffered the same perspective to Southern audiences, the hypocrisy Wheatley articulated 
was apparent to some but resolutely denied by most. Indeed, attempts to justify the deprivation of 
blacks’ liberty would emerge haltingly in the early national period and then metastasize in the 
decades before the Civil War. 
◦     ◦     ◦ 
 One of the most widespread and pernicious myths about slavery in the era of the 
Constitutional Convention was that the South, whose elite were wedded to forced labor, was 
unbendingly bound to the institution in economic and philosophical ways. While it is impossible to 
argue that slavery was not important, the vast majority of northern and southern white families did 
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not own slaves, and even among those who did, there was a substantial percentage who confessed to 
misgivings about race-based forced labor. More profound dependence emerged a generation or two 
after the Revolutionary era, as the advent of the cotton gin and addition of more southern states 
would effect a marked increase in the enslaved population beginning in the last decade of the 19th 
century.75 The fewer slaves there were, the easier it would have been to cut the legs out from under 
the institution itself. Even for those involved, slavery had become less lucrative, owing to factors 
such as the declining profit margins of tobacco farming.76 This was the landscape of the 1770s and 
1780s, a historical moment that presented several reasons for what Gary Nash calls “the opportune 
time for abolishing slavery.”77 
 In the era of the American Revolution, there was in fact a movement of considerable 
momentum to condemn, phase out or even abolish slavery. This was a movement that originated, 
predictably, in Northern areas with relatively low slave populations, areas where slavery was not the 
visible core of the society and economy. But it also took root in places where abolition would have 
dramatically transformed the landscape. Contrary to Nash’s assertion that abolitionism was waning 
in the leadup to the Convention, this was a movement that crossed sectional lines, a movement both 
public and private and a movement that sowed the seeds for transformational changes on the new 
national landscape. These seeds, however, would remain fallow inside the Pennsylvania State House 
during the summer of 1787. Outside the State House was a different story. 
The most notable among these loci of vulnerability was Virginia, where the slave trade was 
assessed import duties as early as 1752. Leaders such as Arthur Lee, of the aristocratic Lee clan of 
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Eastern Virginia, began speaking out against slavery earlier than in many other parts of the colonies. 
Lee’s “Address on Slavery” published in the Virginia Gazette of March 19, 1767, condemned slavery 
for several principal reasons. First, that it was “a Violation of both Justice and Religion;” second, 
that it was “dangerous to the safety of the Community in which it prevails” on account of the risk of 
violent rebellion; third, that it retarded cultural advancements; and fourth, that it undermined the 
morals of both slave and slaveowner.78 Lee, who would later represent his state in the Continental 
Congress, had critiqued slavery before but never in a way that garnered so much attention. Benezet 
saw to it that the address was circulated broadly, and as late as 1773, worked alongside devout 
abolitionist Robert Pleasants to distribute it throughout Virginia.79 The most direct effect began to 
materialize less than two weeks after its publication. The House of Burgesses took up legislation that 
ultimately would raise the taxes on slave importations.  
In the summer of 1774, several Virginia counties would help to blaze a trail alongside similar 
actions in Rhode Island, North Carolina and South Carolina, a trail that would be followed months 
later by the Declaration of Resolves. The Resolves, which the First Continental Congress announced 
from Philadelphia, took a decisive step away from dependence on slavery by issuing a momentous 
ban on slave importations. In truth, this ban – promulgated by 56 delegates, including 20 from 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina - was a broader condemnation than that. It 
was a decision to disengage from all dimensions of the slave trade and from anyone yet engaged. In 
the second of 14 resolutions, passed on Oct. 14, the Declaration stated that the colonies would 
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wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our 
vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it.”80  
Several months earlier, a host of Virginia colonies had enacted similar bans while describing 
the slave trade as “injurious,” “wicked, cruel, and unnatural” and “dangerous to virtue and the 
welfare of this country”81 Resentment toward heavy-handed British dictates ensured that no central 
authority was forcing Americans’ hands throughout the colonies. Two years shy of the Declaration 
of Independence, a spirit of unity and cohesiveness was only beginning to bubble up. The idea that 
the colonies, including the slave bastion of Virginia, chose to march in step in denouncing the slave 
trade indicated a formidable attack on the institution that would be put to the test in the cauldron of 
the Constitutional Convention. 
Delaware repealed its decades-old ban on private manumissions in 1787, but Virginia had, 
remarkably, struck first. In 1782, the state overturned a 59-year old law that proscribed private 
manumissions in almost every circumstance. At the time, its population contained roughly 2,000 free 
blacks, a number that would mushroom to 12,766 by 1790.82 Even though this figure was a small 
percentage of the state’s enslaved population, this dramatic increase in only eight years is evidence 
that change was afoot. In the spring of 1783, Jefferson penned a draft of a state constitution that 
never saw the light of day but was shared privately with Madison, who by this point had become a 
close friend. Within the text was a momentous clause, the impact of which would have been 
revolutionary: "The General assembly shall not... permit the introduction of any more slaves to 
reside in this state, or the continuance of slavery beyond the generation which shall be living on the 
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31st day of December 1800; all persons born after that day being hereby declared free."83 This would 
have banned the importation of slaves and phased out slavery’s existence entirely via gradual 
emancipation. 
This proposal followed the contour of a Pennsylvania plan that was ratified in 1780, the 
groundbreaking Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery. But Pennsylvania was a place that had 
been shaped for a century by Quakers, whose anti-slavery beliefs and advocacy put them at the 
vanguard of the abolition movement on both sides of the Atlantic. The colony was founded by the 
Quaker entrepreneur William Penn, was dubbed a Holy Experiment and was populated substantially 
by members of that egalitarian faith. It was as early as 1727 that the Society of Friends condemned 
slavery in the American colonies.84 A remarkable 70 years earlier, British dissenter George Fox, the 
sect’s founder, had pointed out the incongruence between slavery and Quaker beliefs in equality. 
The Quaker-infused ethos in Pennsylvania, steeped over time, helped ensure that it never depended 
heavily on slavery whether in 1780 or at any other point. The Pennsylvania law is deservedly 
appreciated for its trailblazing place in the abolition movement. Massachusetts, too, was ahead of the 
curve, as a series of legal decisions collectively known as the Quock Walker cases in effect banned 
slavery as of 1783.85  
But the landscape differed considerably in Virginia, a state with by far a larger enslaved 
population than any other. And among the leading exemplars of contradiction was Jefferson, a 
figure personally and professionally rooted in the soil of the Old Dominion, as he was scarcely 
removed from his two-year term as Governor of Virginia. This was Jefferson, writing the draft 
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constitution at a time when he owned approximately 10,000 acres of land and almost 200 slaves in 
his beloved mountaintop dominion at Monticello.86 This was a plan that was nothing short of 
revolutionary. 
It is left to sheer speculation as to whether Jefferson’s draft would have been ratified by 
Virginia’s General Assembly, or whether the gradual-emancipation clause would have been accepted 
in some form. The proposal never came to a vote because Virginia never called a state constitutional 
convention, which is where such changes would have been considered. Instead, with the 
Revolutionary War raging, the state maintained its original constitution of 1776. The Virginia 
Constitution was the first of its kind in America and a document that bore striking resemblance in 
several regards to the Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson was writing at that very 
moment. One of these commonalities is evident in its critique of King George III, who had been 
“prompting our Negroes to rise in Arms among us, those very negroes whom, by an inhuman use of 
his Negative, he hath refused us permission to exclude by Law.”87 Here Jefferson rightly alleges that 
the king had stifled Virginian attempts to ban importation of slaves. Virginia and 10 other states, 
with Georgia an exception and North Carolina having deterred the trade with a steep import tax, 
would do just that by the time the delegates would convene in Philadelphia in 1787.88 These bans 
were not merely wartime measures to reduce the economic entanglements with enemy Britain; this 
was a postwar reality suggesting that the strength and permanence of the institution of slavery were 
far weaker than historians like Jack Rakove89 and Joseph J. Ellis90 argue. 
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Virginia’s impulse to proscribe slave importations was not, however, the result of a 
widespread moral transformation. Although there was a rise in anti-slavery sentiment at the time, a 
principal impetus was economic. Because Virginia had so many more slaves than any other state, 
prohibiting importations would have limited the capacity of other states to augment their enslaved 
populations; such growth would have been attained only by natural increase. To the extent that the 
rise in slave population was slowed, Virginia, which had a lesser need to import, would become 
more advantaged relative to other states. Dating to the 1760s, this theory compelled Virginia elites 
such as Richard Henry Lee and George Mason to push for legislative action that would have 
strengthened their own financial position without effecting outright abolition.91 Such advocacy faced 
opposition from both the House of Burgesses and the British government, although the state in 
1778 did pass an outright ban on slave importation – ratifying a bill that had gotten its start with 
Lee’s efforts four years earlier. 
The other explanation for Virginia’s advocacy of an importation ban was a desire not to 
benefit the British during the Revolutionary War. With the colonies’ trans-oceanic shipping capacity 
far outstripped by that of the British, a large percentage of America’s slave importations were 
transported by British vessels. Few colonists, save perhaps for some Loyalists, had any interest in 
filling Britain’s coffers at a time when the colonial power had become the enemy. As evidenced in 
the boycotts of all manner of British goods, which had been in effect for several years by the time 
the war began, Americans took stock of their economic leverage and were willing to use it. 
Importantly, colonists’ attachment to the institution of slavery was not so great that it trumped their 
political objectives. The stoppage in slave importations is significant, given the macro- and micro-
economic ramifications on America, and it could have served to generate momentum toward 
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weaning the colonists off their time-tested reliance on the institution. Virginia, despite its massive 
enslaved population, was at the vanguard of this movement. 
  Richard Dunn argues convincingly that the elite of the Chesapeake region were uniquely 
empowered to move the nation against slavery in the 1780s.92 That over half the nation’s slave 
population resided in Virginia and Maryland helps substantiate this assertion; the region’s biggest 
slaveholders had the most to lose amid the prospect of any form of abolition, yet a substantial 
number of them advocated precisely that. The Chesapeake was, of course, also the home of many of 
the most powerful individuals and prominent families in America – the Lees, the Washingtons, the 
Custises, the Randolphs, the Carters. While many of this elite class were known for their wealth and 
influence, another of their defining characteristics was exposure to and acceptance of some of the 
more liberal ideas of the era. Among these was the immorality of slavery.  
There were other developments that primed the Chesapeake for a de-emphasis on slavery. 
One was religion. Although interpretations of Christian doctrine emerged at the heart of pro-slavery 
arguments as the 19th century progressed, the late 18th century was a time when there was 
considerable initiative to move in the opposite direction. In Baltimore, the seminal Christmas 
Conference of 1784, at which the Methodist Episcopal Church was established, featured a resolution 
opposing slavery. Methodist Conferences in 1780 and 1784 also emphatically denounced the 
institution of slavery and passed regulations against owning, buying and selling slaves.93 
Consequently, thousands of blacks free and enslaved were brought into Methodism during the 
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subsequent decade.94 Another factor alleviating the reliance on slaves was a diversification of the 
Chesapeake economy. The beginnings of industrialization were taking root, but even within 
agriculture, circumstances grew less favorable for the institution of slavery. This was an era when 
tobacco farming became less prominent amid the regional emergence of wheat, corn and livestock, 
accompanied by a shift from the type of gang-labor systems that once had fueled the demand for 
slaves.95 This mitigating influence fits broader patterns seen in various societies over time. As 
economist Jenny Bourne argues, slavery has existed in those circumstances where the elite benefit 
economically from its existence.96 The converse - that slavery’s decreasing economic importance 
weakened the reliance on it - was proving true across the United States but particularly in the 
Chesapeake region of the 1780s.97 Declining profitability trumped whatever other motives may have 
existed and was a catalyst to opposition to slavery on humanitarian grounds. 
As much momentum as the anti-slavery movement had in Virginia, the opportunity for 
reform may have been riper still in Maryland.98 The state featured substantial numbers of not only 
Methodists, but also Quakers, and an economy that was less reliant on tobacco than Virginia’s. In 
1754, the colony’s General Assembly voted not once, but twice to tax slave imports: first, a five 
percent tax in February, followed in October by “an additional duty of 10 per cent on slaves 
imported over and above the usual duty and the special duty imposed in (February.)”99 The 
Maryland Yearly Meeting of Quakers railed against slavery and called for a petition to be introduced 
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to the colony’s legislature, which occurred in 1771.100 That same year, Matthew Tilghman, who later 
represented Maryland in the Continental Congress and presided as chairman and president of 
various state conventions, submitted a bill to increase the tax on slave importation. The bill became 
law in November 1771.101 The following year, Maryland pressured King George II to abolish the 
“great inhumanity” that was the slave trade, also citing the hindrance it placed on the economy and 
the immigration of free people.102 Gustavus Scott, a two-time delegate to the Annapolis Convention, 
and Luther Martin had formidable objections to slavery. The landscape was not entirely ripe for 
reform, of course; a notable counterbalance to the Quakers and Methodists was the influence of 
Maryland’s Jesuits, who were more bound to tradition and therefore resistant to reform.103 
Just east of the Chesapeake colonies, Delaware took significant steps against slavery. Some 
of the most prominent Delawareans – Caesar Rodney, John Dickinson, extremely wealthy governor 
Richard Bassett – freed their own slaves or fought against slavery. The colonial constitution ratified 
in 1776 included a ban on slave importations. Quaker- and Methodist-led reform efforts 
accompanied economic trends that aided the shift in the slavery landscape, as many farmers 
abandoned tobacco in favor of wheat and corn crops that required less labor. After becoming a 
state, Delaware in 1787 barred slaves from being sold out of state in most circumstances. A sizable 
Quaker presence in the state led to the drafting of a petition that was read before the Assembly on 
January 9, 1786. One of several similar entreaties to be written in Delaware during this era, the 
petition was signed by well over 200 individuals, not an insignificant number given that the state’s 
population was the lowest in the United States. Characteristically for Delaware’s anti-slavery 
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petitions, this missive cited the ideological tenets of the Declaration of Independence in condemning 
the state for “withholding from (slaves) their just and Natural right of personal Freedom.”104 
Several states formed the first wave of the anti-slavery movement, not counting New 
Hampshire, which rejected a 1779 Constitution featuring outright abolition. Vermont had been the 
first to approve of abolition, enshrining the ban in 1777 with its maiden constitution. Pennsylvania 
followed with its Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery in 1780, and in the same year, 
Massachusetts outlawed slavery with constitutional language that would be upheld by its state 
supreme court three years later. In 1784, Connecticut and Rhode Island enacted legislation similar to 
Pennsylvania’s, with Rhode Island declaring that all children born henceforth to slave mothers 
would be free and Connecticut granting freedom to future children of slave mothers once the 
offspring reached 25. During the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, a process that lasted 
from December 1777 to February 1781, these states shared a small enslaved population and a 
nascent yet undeniable commitment to ending slavery.  
This commitment was buttressed by a nationwide legislative landscape that did not reward 
and protect slaveholders the way the Constitution ultimately did. Even among the ranks of 
slaveholders, even in the South, belief in the institution of slavery wavered considerably. 
◦     ◦     ◦ 
Mostly in the north but to some extent in the south, there were many members of the 
political, economic and cultural elite who criticized slavery in the years before the Convention. 
Countering the conventional wisdom that slavery lasted so long because the elites tolerated or 
defended it, an examination of the Revolutionary and pre-Constitutional period suggests otherwise. 
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There was ample opposition in many corners. Many prominent, influence-wielding individuals 
spoke, wrote or acted in opposition to slavery in the early national period. Their collective clout 
could have been enough to ensure a progressive outcome on the slavery issue at the Constitutional 
Convention, but circumstances unfolded otherwise. 
No Convention attendee was more influential than John Jay, who by 1787 had developed a 
mass of influence, experience and personal relationships that placed him among the first rank of 
Founding Fathers. John Adams minced no words when describing Jay’s standing, averring that the 
41-year-old statesman wielded as much influence among Convention attendees as “any of the rest, 
indeed of almost as much weight as all the rest. This gentleman had as much influence in the 
preparatory measures in digesting the Constitution, and in obtaining its adoption, as any man in the 
nation."105 
Jay served as the President of the Continental Congress from 1778-79, served as Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs and Minister to Spain during the Revolutionary War and helped negotiate the Treaty 
of Paris that ended the war in 1783. He was well-established socially, too, hailing from a wealthy 
family, building a career as an attorney and marrying the eldest daughter of New Jersey governor 
William Livingston. After the Convention, Jay was co-author of the Federalist Papers, served six 
years as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and spent six years as governor 
of New York.  
Born into a New York family with large slaveholdings, Jay was determined to chart his own 
course on this issue. As early as 1777, he sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to amend the New York state 
constitution to include a slavery ban.106 He wrote to the state’s attorney general in 1780 declaring 
that if he were a member of the state legislature, he “would never cease moving” toward abolition - 
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or would choose to quit the body rather than be a part of an institution that clung to slavery.107 In 
January 1785, Jay was first among equals at the founding of the New-York Society for Promoting 
the Manumission of Slaves, and Protecting Such of Them as Have Been, or May be Liberated, 
commonly referred to as the New York Manumission Society. The seminal role he played there 
speaks volumes regarding the principles he took to the Pennsylvania State House in May of 1787.  
Like Jay, many of the Society’s founding members were slaveholders most interested in 
advancing plans for gradual emancipation, though a militant faction demanded nothing short of total 
and immediate freedom for all. The Society debated the complexities of such emancipation schemes 
and met with failure on some counts – bitter fights in New York’s bicameral legislature prevented 
consensus on the civil rights of would-be freedmen - but did triumph in providing the impetus for 
the state’s 1785 laws largely banning slave importation and easing private manumissions. Forty-six of 
47 members of the Assembly (the lower house) cast votes that year in support of some form of 
emancipation.108 Like many other states, New York found it difficult to make a clean break with 
slavery, but there was considerable political support to take steps in that direction. Jay, who as 
governor would sign the state’s gradual ban on slavery in 1799, was the tip of the spear. 
In 1786, Jay had written a letter to an R. Lushington, a Quaker from Charleston who was 
somewhat of an anti-slavery advocate, in which he made an unqualified call for the abolition of 
slavery. Invoking the honor of “the States, as well as justice and humanity,” Jay highlighted the 
hypocrisy of white Americans’ striving for liberty while “deny(ing) that blessing to others.”109 This 
was not merely philosophical dissonance; Jay was himself a slaveowner who sought a traversable 
route to escape it. 
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Even during the Convention, Jay presided over an August meeting of the Society at which 
the first order of business was to study an arresting proposal by Melancton Smith. Smith had 
proposed that Jay, as the Society’s unanimously elected president, be directed to push the delegates 
in Philadelphia on the slavery issue.110 Smith had recommended that Jay present the Constitutional 
Convention with written condemnation of slavery and a plea to ban the trade. By the following day, 
Jay had written that petition, his beliefs and aspirations made plain.111 It never was delivered.  
The New York Manumission Society counted among its members another individual of 
eminent renown: Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton made a splash upon joining the Society by 
proposing, ultimately fruitlessly, that each individual’s membership would be contingent upon 
manumission of his slaves. This indicated Hamilton’s desire to have this peer group speak with 
actions and not merely words. 
And at that Feb. 4, 1785, meeting to draw up an organizational constitution, Hamilton made 
another suggestion with an eye toward the post-emancipation aftermath that vexed both north and 
south, including some slaveholders and non-slaveholders. Hamilton advocated for the creation of a 
register of all freedmen, which would mitigate the ever-present danger of bounty hunters who would 
apprehend free blacks into slavery regardless of their current or former status.112 Hamilton had good 
cause to reckon with the prospect of bounty hunters, as they would continue to ply their inimical 
trade up to and during the Civil War.113 
Though an immigrant, having left his native Nevis as a teenager, Hamilton was in some ways 
quintessentially American. This was a man who fought against slavery, was on the vanguard of 
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mainstream abolitionism in the United States and put his reputation on the line in advocating for the 
enlistment of black soldiers in the Revolutionary War. And this was the same man who married into 
an elite family of slaveholders, the Schuylers of New York, and went on to assist his in-laws by 
conducting several types of business transactions involving slaves. Hamilton himself may have 
owned slaves, although this is a point of scholarly disagreement.114  
Many of Hamilton’s actions regarding slavery were subject to differing interpretations. On 
one hand, he was an inveterate supporter of property rights, a philosophy he sustained throughout 
his public life and one that would rear its head during the Constitutional Convention, when 
Hamilton and others showed reluctance to interfere with slaveholders’ claim to human property. At 
the end of the Revolutionary War, however, he waffled. The Treaty of Paris had forbidden the 
British from “carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,” a clause 
they flagrantly violated, but Hamilton took the uncommon step of yielding on his principles.115 
Instead, he chose to prioritize the wartime pledges of emancipation that the British had offered 
fugitive slaves, a stance that coincided neatly with his aversion to troubling the postwar waters with 
Britain any further. As much of an Anglophile as a Patriot could be, Hamilton made enemies aplenty 
during his life with his unsparing tongue and dogmatic views. He shelved all of that in this case – 
not so much to ensure the emancipation of slaves, but to acknowledge the complexity of war’s end. 
 In a region teeming with laws that restricted or proscribed slavery, it was not a surprise to 
reckon with prominent Northerners who opposed or waffled when it came to slavery. However, 
there were many Southerners of similar ideological bent, men who were as wealthy, powerful and 
influential as any of the arch defenders of slavery. The beliefs of men such as Patrick Henry, Robert 
Pleasants and George Mason are too often ignored in scholarship of the early national period. 
                                                 
114 Michelle DuRoss. "Somewhere in Between: Alexander Hamilton and Slavery." Early America Review IX, no. 4 
(Winter/Spring 2011). 
115 Treaty of Paris, September 3, 1783, UST 1 (1783), 1. 
41 
 Patrick Henry, rebel par excellence, is in some ways the exemplar of this breed of 
Southerner. Referring to Some Historical Account of Guinea - a deeply influential book by leading 
abolitionist Anthony Benezet that had been given him by his friend, Robert Pleasants - Henry was 
moved to reflect not only on the nature of slavery but also more directly on his own involvement in 
the institution.116 His Jan. 18, 1773, letter to Pleasants, which was part of a remarkable 
correspondence between the two, thanked his friend for the Benezet book and laid bare the spiritual 
awakenings it had kindled in him. Henry invoked Christian morality, world history and American 
ideals in denouncing slavery as “a Species of Violence & Tyranny, which our rude barbarous but 
more honest Ancestors detested.”117 Henry went on to call slavery “abominable,” “repugnant” and, 
unlike many who presumed God’s blessing and backing in defending the institution, critiqued it as 
“inconsistant (sic) with the Bible & destructive to Liberty.”118 Henry’s use of this last term is 
particularly interesting given his famous exhortation two years later, when he thundered before the 
Second Virginia Convention: “Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of 
chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, 
give me liberty or give me death!” 
Many white patriots invoked slavery as a way to describe their status under British rule.119 
Their phrasing usually was interpreted as a metaphor, for whites were not enslaved physically. 
Rather, they felt limited and oppressed by the economic and political straits they alleged the British 
had foisted upon them; they perceived their hardships to be as inescapable and encompassing as 
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race-based, chattel slavery actually was.120 Men like Henry, a slaveholder for his entire adult life, were 
acutely aware of the power of their word choice. “Slavery” was not a term to be used lightly. And 
for that reason, it is impossible to reflect on Henry’s renowned oration without reckoning with his 
long-articulated beliefs on slavery. 
Unlike some of his contemporaries, Henry had the courage to judge himself objectively and 
publicly. His aforementioned letter to Pleasants smoldered with an explicit critique of his own 
choice to own slaves: “I will not, I cannot justify it,” Henry wrote.121 True to his word, he did not. 
Henry assailed slavery in his private correspondence on a number of levels – moral, religious, 
philosophical – yet perpetuated it at the same time with his actions. He neither defended the 
institution of slavery nor sold his own slaves. Henry was not alone in this cognitive dissonance, this 
disparity between word and deed.  
Though he declined to justify slaveholding, Henry continually perpetuated it on a personal 
level. Henry was given slaves as a wedding gift, purchased more as his finances would allow and 
ended up owning as many as 100 of them. This was both a multiplier of his power and a symbol of 
it. It is clear that Henry could have leveraged his position to greater effect but did not. Henry 
biographer Robert Douthat Meade holds that by the mid-1780s, Henry, as the inaugural Governor 
of Virginia and in his second term, “could now muster more power and influence – when he chose 
to do so – than almost any other American of his day.”122 On slavery, he chose not to bring to bear 
the full measure of his clout. Having been born and raised in a society built around slavery, Henry 
had evolved into a man who profited immensely from it on a personal level and could not part from 
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it. His statements indicate he wished he could. His beliefs compelled him to do so. But he could not, 
despite his vision for Virginia that would have boosted immigration of farmers and artisans as a way 
to compensate for the freeing of slaves.123 
Despite his personal failure to move away from slavery, he made political strides in that 
direction. Henry is believed to have supported the 1782 Virginia law authorizing manumission of 
slaves in certain circumstances.124 Three years later, he was Governor of Virginia when the Virginia 
Assembly struck what seemed a blow for progress in prohibiting further importation of slaves. This 
law was no boon to African-Americans, though, as it barred slaves from testifying in court against 
whites and authorized physical punishment against slaves who joined in unlawful assemblies or 
traveled without written authorization from whites.125  
 Pleasants, whose Curles Neck Plantation was not far from Henry’s own in eastern Virginia, 
initially was caught in the same quandary as his friend Henry – even a stickier one, in some respects. 
Unlike Henry, Pleasants grew up knowing nothing but slavery. He came from an elite family of 
tobacco magnates who owned over 500 slaves but came to a point when they longer wanted to. 
Having developed a relationship with Anthony Benezet and other northern Quakers, Pleasants and 
his father, John, were eager to disseminate the beliefs of those vanguard reformers; an August 1772 
letter from Robert to his brother mentions a requested order of two dozen “Antony Benizet 
Treateses (sic)”and alludes to one dozen already received.126 Robert Pleasants and his father sought in 
1771 to order the gradual emancipation of their slaves but could not due to the illegality of private 
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manumissions at that time. Robert Pleasants saw to it that this changed by successfully pushing for 
new legislation in 1782, whereupon he immediately freed his slaves.  
A political outsider, Pleasants attempted on many occasions to influence those with hands 
directly on the levers of power. He had entrée enough to write to powerbrokers such as 
Washington, Jefferson and Henry in an effort to persuade them to implement the legal changes he 
was not personally able to effect. Pleasants went on to become the founding president of the 
Virginia Abolition Society and in 1801 founded Virginia’s first school for free blacks.127 Avoiding the 
hypocrisy that ensnared some of his progress-minded peers, Pleasants expressed in his will the same 
sentiment by which he lived the last three decades of his life: the “full conviction that slavery is an 
evil of great magnitude.”128 This quintessential Southern planter, a man of influence, status and 
exceptional wealth, had become a full-fledged abolitionist. 
Another Virginian, James Madison, stopped short of emancipating his slaves but was halting 
in his support of the institution of slavery. In the early 1780s, Madison bought 900 acres of land in 
New York with a mind to “depend as little as possible on the labour of slaves.”129 This move likely 
reflected one of two motivations on Madison’s part, both of which would substantiate the viability 
of the anti-slavery movement. Perhaps Madison, reading the reformist tea leaves of the time, was 
hedging his economic bets to maintain his prosperity should slavery be abolished. This would have 
been a fairly stunning indicator of the direction the would-be Father of the Constitution saw the 
country heading. The other explanation is that Madison was acting in accordance with his beliefs, 
which for years had reflected considerable opposition to slavery. He expressed private misgivings 
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about slavery in his mid-20s and the magnitude of his criticism only grew from there. Around the 
time of the Constitutional Convention, Madison made repeated statements opposing slavery, and to 
some extent, his words were accompanied by deeds. When one of his slaves, Billy, tried to escape in 
1783 while accompanying Madison to Philadelphia, Madison decided not to return him to Virginia 
by way of punishment for “merely for coveting that liberty for which” white colonists had “paid the 
price of so much blood” and “proclaimed so often to be the right, & worthy the pursuit, of every 
human being.”130 Madison realized the hypocrisy of a free nation keeping slaves and was willing to 
admit it. 
Later in life, after he had served as the nation’s fourth president (1809-17), he waxed more 
impassioned and principled in his denunciations of slavery. He continued to wrestle with a post-
emancipation framework that he had pondered as far back as 1789, when in he had supported 
colonization but worried that, if it were to happen in the American West, freedmen would be 
subjected to hostility from “Savages.”131 Madison’s attachment to the idea of relocating slaves 
peaked as he served as president of the American Colonization Society from 1833-36, the last three 
years of his life.132 Unlike some supporters of colonization, Madison was fueled primarily by his 
disapproval of slavery. It was a disapproval decades in the making. A month before heading to 
Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention, Madison had made plain his acknowledgement of 
the ideological quicksand on which the new nation was treading: “[w]here slavery exists the 
republican theory becomes still more fallacious."133 Here Madison challenges the very authenticity of 
the American form of government, despite Rakove’s inaccurate characterization of Madison’s 
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“carefully guarded thoughts” on the subject of slavery.134 Years later, Madison would yearn for “a 
rapid erasure of that blot from our Republican character.”135 Yet having owned slaves his entire 
adulthood, he never freed them in life or death. Madison stands as yet another testament to the 
difficulty some of his peers felt in reconciling the personal and the philosophical, the monetary and 
the moral. 
Franklin, who would later loom over the Constitutional Convention as its statesman 
emeritus, faced a similar struggle. He owned as many as seven slaves at various points in his life but 
freed them when his beliefs on the issue shifted. During his career as a publisher, he printed 
periodicals featuring advertisements for runaway slaves but also Quaker pamphlets criticizing 
slavery. By the mid-1780s, owing a considerable debt to his friendship with Benezet, Franklin’s 
views had changed so drastically that he became president of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. 
Signs of this shift were evident early on. 
As early as 1764, while serving as deputy postmaster-general of the colonies, Franklin went 
to England and disparaged slavery – in particular, England's role in promulgating it in the colonies.136 
As several contemporaries would do during the war, Franklin pointed out that there were colonial 
laws against slavery that were rejected by the British government. By the time of the Revolution, of 
course, Franklin’s allegiance to (and employment by) Britain had ended. Franklin was dogged in his 
efforts early in the Revolutionary War to win France’s support for the rebellion. Part of his appeal to 
the French, echoing that of Jefferson, was to persuade them that America would not delay in 
moving away from slavery.  
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During the Constitutional Convention, Franklin, with the backing of the Pennsylvania 
Abolition Society, intended to introduce a proposal that would have included a statement of 
principle condemning the slave trade and slavery itself.137 In principle he stood not alone, but rather 
shoulder to shoulder with first-rank figures such as Jay and Hamilton. Yet in a microcosm of the 
broader contours of the slavery debate, he was outmatched by the strength of other delegates’ 
priorities. Several northern delegates persuaded him to withdraw the proposal because they believed 
it would have alienated southern delegates, thus jeopardizing the consensus that all so desperately 
sought to nurture.138 
Though Franklin’s agenda may have been stunted, his ideological evolution was not. He 
wrote several public papers denouncing slavery. Perhaps the most prominent among them was a 
1789 letter in which he excoriated slavery but also sounded a note of caution as to how 
emancipation should unfold: “Slavery is such an atrocious debasement of human nature, that its very 
extirpation, if not performed with solicitous care, may sometimes open a source of serious evils.”139 
Franklin went onto describe what he believed should happen upon former slaves after they were 
“restored to freedom.” He advocated a steadfast governmental commitment to assisting the 
freedmen in areas such as occupational training and education, a step he had taken personally in 
supporting and visiting a Philadelphia school for blacks in the 1750s and 1760s. 
The Revolutionary Era was one in which economic and political power was wielded 
disproportionately by the elite, who enjoyed commensurate influence in all dimensions of society. 
These were men whose access to wealth, education, political circles, travel, and power exceeded the 
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wildest dreams of the average colonial. It is impossible, then, to overstate the significance of the 
statements some of the elite made against slavery. 
Few individuals spoke out more strongly than Thomas Jefferson. As early as 1774, preceding 
the emergence of mainstream critiques of slavery, he called abolition “the great object of desire” in 
an America where slavery had been “unhappily introduced” by the British in the nascent stage of its 
development. The result, Jefferson wrote in A Summary View of the Rights of British America, was that 
the states were “deeply wounded.”140 Although the pamphlet’s objective was to illustrate the right of 
the colonies to be free, its commentary on slavery remains noteworthy amid the discourse of the 
day. 
In his Notes on the State of Virginia, written in 1781, Jefferson railed against a societal structure 
“permitting one half the citizens thus to trample on the rights of the other.” He could see that 
masters inherently became “despots” bereft of “morals” and that slaves became “enemies” of the 
state."141 Five years after his Declaration of Independence spotlighted them in momentous fashion, 
Jefferson again invoked the power of natural rights, rhetorically wondering how the liberties of 
anyone in a slave society were secure when God-given rights were denied to some. That he took 
such a principled, moral position in the only book he ever published was quite noteworthy. Yet 
Jefferson was pragmatic, too, theorizing that it was preferable to free the slaves proactively and 
preemptively so as to head off what may have been inevitable slave rebellion in the future.142 Like so 
many whites of various philosophical backgrounds, Jefferson was terrified at the prospect of slave 
rebellion. In 1784, Jefferson proposed to ban slavery in a huge swath of newly acquired territories 
west of the Appalachian Mountains and abolish it everywhere after 1800; the proposition failed by a 
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single vote in the Confederation Congress but set the stage for the abolition of slavery three years 
later in the Northwest Ordinance. Jefferson was perhaps the quintessential American commentator 
on slavery of his day, given that his moral opposition to slavery could not subjugate his personal 
attachment to the institution, a failing Paul Finkelman has spotlighted. Douglas Wilson, a 
Jeffersonian scholar, implies that it is unreasonable and presentist to expect abolitionist views from 
someone who grew up in a slave society, inherited slaves and was richly privileged by his status on 
the slavery landscape.143 The legitimacy of these assertions is gainsaid by the fact that individuals 
whose circumstances mirrored Jefferson’s made choices and acted on their beliefs far differently 
than he did. Furthermore, few men had the kinds of opportunities to act against slavery that 
Jefferson did – opportunities that, in Paul Finkelman’s view, Jefferson largely squandered.144 
 Another slaveholding Virginian, George Mason, had a record nearly as contradictory as 
Jefferson’s. Mason’s first important public paper criticized the institution of slavery on several 
counts. Writing on December 23, 1765, he seemed every bit a man motivated to limit the expansion 
of slavery. Mason lamented that Virginia never had fully considered a ban on slave importation or 
the encouragement of immigration by free people, which he believed would have improved the 
colonial economy. Foreshadowing the remarks of Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional 
Convention, Mason also noted the impact of “the ill Effect such a Practice has upon the Morals & 
Manners of our People.”145 He even reached back into ancient history, citing the example of the 
Romans. The Roman Empire, he said, was done in by its decision to traffic heavily in slaves, a 
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turning point Mason called the “primary Cause of the Destruction of the most flourishing 
Government that ever existed.”146 
 Never plainly advocating prohibition of slavery, Mason cannot be fairly called an abolitionist. 
He was, however, a Founding Father willing to move on the issue, willing to take into account 
moral, economic and political factors that would set the stage for the evanescence of the institution 
that had benefited him tremendously in his personal and political life. Like Jefferson, he thought 
slavery would wither on the vine as it grew, weakening as it expanded beyond its Chesapeake core. 
Mason would later draft Virginia’s nonimportation statute, which Washington himself presented to 
the Virginia Assembly. He took a stronger stance still at the Convention when he critiqued slavery 
with a rhetorical, emotional “blast” that stood out “as one of the most stirring speeches of the 
Convention.”147 
While it is hard to ascertain the precise levels of enslaved populations in each colony or state 
before the first federal census in 1790, it is clear that many Americans emerged from the 
Revolutionary War with a spirited enthusiasm for denying blacks the liberty that independence had 
made possible for whites. The rebellion’s embrace of enlightenment ideals opened a new dimension 
to the fight against slavery, but at the same time, the way it had disrupted and threatened slavery 
caused the institution’s defenders to double down. Duncan MacLeod notes a postbellum sea change 
among slavery-related laws, which in many places were emboldened, even sanctified under “a 
coherent racist doctrine that became a sacred, significant totem in American society.”148 This 
divergence, a simultaneous strengthening of pro- and anti-slavery philosophies, occasioned a 
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wrestling match in which the economic and political leverage of the slaveocracy prevailed until the 
Civil War struck the decisive blow. 
As Adam Rothman points out, slavery was “a basic metaphor of power” within political 
rhetoric following the Revolution.149 This was years in the making. Indeed, founders such as 
Washington and Dickinson had helped shape that discourse even before the colonists decided on 
independence. Slauter argues that the potency of political slavery rhetoric was derived in no small 
part from its creation in a society featuring race-based slavery.150 Because colonists knew what 
slavery was, they could more ably flesh out various conceptions of freedom. The most salient one 
was political, a state of free will to determine one’s destiny untrammeled by the strictures that were 
imposed by government on the other side of the Atlantic. 
In the 1770s and 1780s, the North was not the only region charged by anti-slavery currents. 
Just as there were Northerners who approved of and supported the institution of race-based chattel 
slavery, there were Southerners who showed willingness to limit it. This was evident at the 
Constitutional Convention and on the political landscape of the preceding years. 
4 PRIVATE AND PUBLIC: FROM ROBERT CARTER III TO THE NORTHWEST 
ORDINANCE 
The biggest myth regarding slavery at the Constitutional Convention is that the North had 
little choice but to capitulate to Southern intransigence. There are several major flaws in this 
perspective, which has been promulgated by many eminent scholars in the last several decades. 
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Bernard Bailyn, one of the most influential scholars on the Revolutionary era, starts with a 
falsehood - “[m]ost of the Revolutionary leaders hated slavery – not one of them ever publicly 
endorsed it” - and from there draws errant conclusions.151 Although the terms “Revolutionary 
leaders” and “hated” are subject to interpretation, there is no shortage of leading men from this time 
period who spoke and wrote in support of slavery. Framers of the Constitution such as Charles 
Pinckney, his cousin Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and John Rutledge, all of South Carolina; and 
Georgia’s Abraham Baldwin made clear at the Convention their approval of slavery. 
  Still, there were many founders who were to some degree opposed to slavery, and the 
question fumbled by Bailyn is why they did not end it. In his influential essay, “The Central Themes 
of the American Revolution: An Interpretation,” written in 1973, Bailyn constructs an elaborate 
argument as to why the Founding Fathers were circumscribed in their ability to move toward 
abolishing slavery. Bailyn submits that many of the era’s statesmen were opposed to slavery, which 
has been substantiated above, but he also treads onto thin ice in inferring why they could not act on 
their beliefs. In short, his conclusion was that infusing emancipation into white Americans’ striving 
for liberty would have been dangerous. It was potentially destabilizing enough to empower the white 
masses; as Edmund S. Morgan puts it, “[a]ristocrats could more safely preach equality in a slave 
society than in a free one.”152 Such a circumstance was safer, to be sure, but there was much about 
the revolutionary and founding periods that was risky. Bailyn suggests not only that the momentous 
phrase “all men are created equal” did not refer to all men - and all women – but that it could not. 
Denying that blacks had a God-given right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness was a matter 
of survival for the colonial rebels. In Bailyn’s words, “their refusal, in a word, to allow the 
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Revolutionary movement to slide off into fanaticism, is one of the Revolution’s most important 
features.”153 But it is justified to describe as fanaticism the American Revolution itself – an ad hoc, 
patchwork, largely unpaid militia’s armed rebellion against the world’s strongest country and against 
a consanguine people. Bailyn embraces the legitimacy of one brand of fanaticism, an against-all-olds 
political revolt, but rejects out of hand the feasibility of another. 
Further, as has been argued above, it is an empirical falsehood to imply that emancipating 
one’s slaves or supporting emancipation was too difficult. Taking stock of the economic, political 
and social circumstances in which the Founders lived, Bailyn submits that it is unreasonable “to 
expect them to have been able to transcend altogether the limitations of their own age”154 and cites 
the “complexities of life that kept them from realizing their ideals.”155 Although considerable inertia 
and vested interests compelled the founders not to move toward ending slavery, the proof that it 
could be done is that it was, in fact, done. 
 Among the founders, there were individuals who overcame the myriad obstacles to which 
Bailyn refers and struck a blow against slavery. Delaware’s John Dickinson, a firebrand on the 
vanguard of American politics from the 1760s to the 1780s, freed his slaves in 1777. William 
Livingston, governor of New Jersey and like Dickinson a framer of the Constitution, freed his slaves 
before going to the Convention. Franklin freed his late in life as well. George Wythe, the influential 
jurist who attended the Convention but was known more for tutoring Jefferson, John Marshall and 
Henry Clay, took a step similar to Washington and Delaware governor Caesar Rodney and freed his 
slaves in his will. John Rutledge, despite being a staunch slavery defender at the Constitutional 
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Convention, took over his mother’s plantation and 200 slaves in 1760 but dwindled his 
slaveholdings to 60 by 1775 and 28 by 1787.156  
 The greatest counterexample to Bailyn’s assertion regarding the implausibility of freeing 
one’s slaves is Robert Carter III. The grandson of Robert “King” Carter, one of the most prodigious 
slaveowners in American history, a 4-year-old Carter inherited “one of the largest fortunes in 
America” when both his grandfather and father died in 1732, leaving him in possession of vast 
slaveholdings and a grand estate of several thousand acres alongside the Washingtons, Madisons and 
Lees in Virginia’s lush Northern Neck.157 The Carters stood atop the highest rung of the landed 
gentry, occupying social and economic clout far beyond the reach of those who were merely 
wealthy. Robert Carter III had more of a personal stake in slavery than nearly anyone else.  
This vested interest did not deter Carter from acting on the inspiration he derived from the 
ideological revelations of the Revolution. On Sept. 5, 1791, he filed a “Deed of Gift” with the 
Northumberland (Va.) District Court stating his plan and intention to liberate his slaves, who 
numbered in excess of 450.158 It was the largest emancipation by an American slaveholder before or 
since. It was not that Carter was unaware of the vexing questions regarding post-emancipation that 
troubled – and paralyzed, as Bailyn suggests – many of his peers. He simply did not let these 
questions deter him. Carter was “absolutely dismissive” of neighbors’ complaints and concerns 
about the freedmen suddenly integrating into Northern Neck society.159 Carter faced considerable 
criticism and even ostracism from his peers; he ultimately left Virginia for Baltimore in 1793 and 
never returned. These are the kinds of social repercussions that may have daunted others who were 
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weighing whether to manumit their slaves. Edmund Morgan cites this longstanding concern on the 
part of wealthy Virginians as a primary deterrent against emancipations.160  
Importantly, those who advocated emancipation or supported abolition did not claim to 
have devised a comprehensive blueprint for the social or economic landscape that would emerge in 
a country devoid of enslaved persons. Jefferson, among many others, would bemoan the difficulty in 
finding an answer to the question of what would happen after emancipation – perhaps for lack of 
trying. “In fact, Jefferson was not looking for one,” submits Carter biographer Andrew Levy.161 
Years after the tumult of the nation’s birth had subsided, Jefferson still had enormous difficulty 
conceiving of a society that included freed slaves, who “are pests in society by their idleness.”162 In a 
letter to a young neighbor who had planned to free his own slaves, Jefferson also revealed his oft-
expressed fear of miscegenation, or “amalgamation with the other color.”163 This fear was as deep-
seated as it was ironic, given that Jefferson’s own affair with his slave Sally Hemings resulted in at 
least five children. 
With a perspective similar to Bailyn’s, Joseph J. Ellis points out that no model for a biracial 
society existed in the world, “nor had any existed in recorded history.”164 This would have been 
another purported impediment to the Founders’ ability to chart a course for abolition. Ellis submits 
that they could not envision what that sort of society would look like because such did not exist. 
Echoes Bailyn, a racially integrated society would have required a “vast leap of the imagination.”165 
Aside from outright emancipation and racial equality before the law, one of the alternatives to 
emerge was the idea of colonization, or relocating black slaves to Africa. Although broached by 
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figures such as Virginia slaveholder Ferdinando Fairfax late in the 18th century, this idea did not gain 
traction until an unlikely coalition of abolitionists, pro-slavery whites and free blacks embraced it in 
the 1820s.166 But in terms of devising acceptable solutions within the United States, the Founding 
Fathers were some combination of unwilling and unable. For all of Jefferson’s erudition, for all of 
Franklin’s travels, despite the foreign birth of Hamilton, Paterson and seven other Constitutional 
framers, they could not conjure out of whole cloth an image of two races living together as equals. 
There are two problems with this supposed barrier to emancipation. One is the very nature 
of the term “biracial.” Race is generally understood to be a social construct, devoid of biological 
meaning or basis. What white Americans in the late 18th century thought of as race meant something 
significantly different than the connotations of a century earlier or a half-century later, when Irish 
Americans, for example, were often categorized apart from Caucasians with English heritage. 
Depending on how one defines race, the Ottoman Empire of the 16th or 17th century provided an 
example of a multi-ethnic society where diverse peoples coexisted as relative equals. This would 
have been somewhat of a precedent for the American Founders, who were well-versed in history, to 
consider. The other, more meaningful flaw in Ellis’ argument is that the Founders by definition were 
revolutionary. If there were no historical model for biracial harmony, neither was there an example 
of a democratic republic with an elected executive, a trove of inalienable rights and stark limitations 
on the power of government. The Founders’ raison d’etre was to create something new. They clearly 
were undaunted by the prospect of blazing a trail, even at treasonous risk to their own lives. Forging 
a new social landscape would have been consistent, not inconsistent, with the approach they had 
stepped forward to embrace in the Revolutionary era. 
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A more daunting obstacle to emancipation was the issue of compensation, which 
accompanied many proposals for forced emancipation. If the government were going to take 
slaveholders’ property from them, the blow would have been softened by financial reparation. Most 
estimates range from $100-200 for each freed slave. If the 700,000 enslaved people were freed at a 
cost of $150 per capita, the bill to the federal government, assuming it would have been responsible 
for the payouts, would have totaled $105 million. Given that the federal budget for 1790 was $7 
million, this sort of path to emancipation was unworkable if it were to be executed in one fell 
swoop. 
 As Washington wrote in 1786, a legislative solution may have been the only viable one. No 
matter how much anti-slavery rhetoric flowed, no matter how many private manumissions occurred, 
the institution of slavery never faced greater strain than when the government itself attacked it. 
 ◦     ◦     ◦ 
One of the most salient victories for the anti-slavery movement was the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, which paved the way for the statehood of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois and 
Wisconsin. Lost in the argument that its ban on slavery was only moderately successful is the reality 
that it represented a decisive move by Congress toward establishing the United States as a free 
nation. 
 The Northwest Ordinance was more than legislation that addressed slavery, of course. It was 
nothing less than a seminal step in the nation’s growth, enacting a host of precedents that would 
shape the United States forever. So impactful was the Ordinance that it serves as a stark rejoinder to 
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those who belittle the résumé of the Confederation Congress.167 Foremost among the facets of this 
legislation was the establishment of a procedure by which the nation would expand. Bordered by the 
Great Lakes, the Appalachian Mountains and the Ohio and upper Mississippi Rivers, over 260,000 
square miles would evolve from undefined territory gained from Britain in the Treaty of Paris (1783) 
to organized, named territories to states admitted to the union after completing several procedural 
steps related to local government. This was the foundation for the addition of part of Minnesota and 
the five states named above, which were to be added with status equal to that of the original 13 
states – several of which made the Ordinance possible by relinquishing vast land claims they had 
harbored since 1783. Momentous and trailblazing, the Ordinance protected religious liberty, habeas 
corpus, fair trials and free speech four years before similar guarantees would be enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights. It set aside land for public education and pledged fair and friendly relations with Native 
Americans, although it must be said that the ineffectiveness of this last clause dwarfed that of the 
slavery ban. 
 The Northwest Ordinance was essentially the next step in a sequence that began with the 
Ordinance of 1784. Written principally by Jefferson, this antecedent legislation addressed an even 
larger territory and initially was to levy a similar sanction on slavery. By proposing a ban on slavery 
after 1800 in a vast area that would stretch from Mississippi to Ohio, Jefferson knew he would have 
helped to hasten slavery’s demise by tilting to 22:5 the ratio of free to slave states.168 Jefferson, a 
Congressman himself, knew how such skewed representation in the legislature would equate to a 
preponderance of votes against slavery. As one of his era’s most learned men, a correspondent 
nonpareil and the son of a land surveyor and speculator, he would have would have understood that 
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the proposed ban entailed ending slavery in some places where it already existed. Though these 
prolific ramifications became moot when the ban was excised from the Ordinance of 1784 prior to 
its passage, they shed light on the contested state of slavery in the years preceding the Convention. 
By the time Congress revisited the topic of the western territories, the issue of slavery still 
was quite urgent. Despite having grown up in a slaveholding family, Massachusetts Congressman 
Rufus King was undaunted in his attempts since the initial rejection to resuscitate the anti-slavery 
clause, seeking to secure the backing of Southern delegates with a fugitive slave clause.169 King, who 
would go onto become an influential voice at the Convention and a candidate for both vice-
president and president, was unable to do so, but his Bay State contemporary Nathan Dane was 
poised to step in where King had fallen short. 
A five-man committee including King issued a preliminary report on the western territories 
on April 25, 1787, which was followed by debate and revisions for over two months. At some point 
in the interim, Dane stepped in and was tasked with helping to write what would become the 
Northwest Ordinance, formally known as An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the 
United States, North-West of the River Ohio. On July 11, meeting in New York, the full body of 
Congress considered the draft. A complete reading was given on July 12. And only after that did 
Dane introduce Article VI, the slavery ban.170 It was an audacious gambit whose outcome was 
surprising even to its author. Wrote Dane to King three days later: 
“When I drew the ordinance which proposed…I had no idea the states would agree 
to the sixth art(icle) prohibiting slavery, as only Massa(chusetts) of the Eastern states 
was present, and therefore omitted it in the draft; but finding the House favorably 
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disposed on this subject, after we had completed the other parts I moved the 
art(icle), which was agreed to without opposition.”171 
The same day Dane added Article VI, the entire Northwest Ordinance, sometimes referred to as the 
Freedom Ordinance, was enacted without debate by a unanimous vote of 18 Congressmen. Their 
ranks included three Virginians, including the estimable Richard Henry Lee, and six other 
Southerners.172 The states represented by the members present were Massachusetts, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, all of which save for 
Massachusetts allowed slavery. Their votes, however, made an indisputable statement. With one 
dramatic strike, slavery had been banned from an area roughly half as large as the aggregate 13 
colonies. One day earlier, 100 miles to the southwest of that propitious vote in New York’s City 
Hall, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had agreed upon what would become perhaps 
the most opprobrious development to emerge out of Philadelphia: the Three-Fifths Compromise. 
The significance of the Northwest Ordinance’s slavery ban is not to be understated. While it 
included a fugitive slave clause that certainly mollified Southerners, this was the first legislation of its 
kind in North America – unqualified, immediate and universal prohibition of enslavement. Ten years 
earlier, in 1777, Vermont’s first constitution had featured a partial ban, prohibiting involuntary 
servitude for men who had reached the age of 21 and women who had reached the age of 18. And 
in the 1780s, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island had 
enacted some manner of gradual or qualified ban. The Freedom Ordinance was a class apart, with its 
magnitude, geographic reach and surprising timing giving rise to considerable mystery as to how it 
came to be that such significant ground was broken. Most notably, how was it that the measure 
garnered unanimous support from Southern congressmen?  
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The bulk of the answer is that Southern opposition to slavery was not as ironclad and 
intransigent as is typically suggested. David Brion Davis contends that “[n]o one can doubt” that the 
1780s’ rise in the anti-slavery movement, long recognized in the American North as well as in 
Britain,  penetrated the Upper South to a substantial degree.173 Many Southern powerbrokers were 
devout proponents of black slavery, but some were not, and their ranks included a considerable 
number who were willing to bend. They were willing to compromise, to negotiate, to deal. In the 
summer of 1787, this was true in New York City and true in Philadelphia, as the Convention was 
awash in a daily current of demands, compromises, hyperbole and ultimata - none of which was fully 
resolved until the delegates adjourned on September 17 and left the Pennsylvania State House for 
the last time. One factor facilitating the Confederation Congress’ surprising vote on the Northwest 
Ordinance was the role of one Manasseh Cutler. 
 Preceded by several generations of clergymen in his family, Cutler was born in 1742 in 
Connecticut and went onto become a schoolteacher, storekeeper, attorney, minister, medic and 
botanist, the hindmost accomplished enough to merit his induction into the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences at its first meeting.174 He was a chaplain in the Revolutionary War and later served 
two terms in Congress as a Representative from Massachusetts. Despite Cutler’s varied interests, 
talents and contributions, he would have faded completely into obscurity if not for the historical 
moment during which he shuttled from New York City to Philadelphia in July 1787. 
One month earlier in Massachusetts, where Cutler had lived since 1771, a privately funded 
militia quashed an economically and politically driven rebellion that had been led in part by veteran 
Daniel Shays. Nine months of raids on debtors’ courts and seizure of property had jolted upper-
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class Americans, in particular, as they perceived a threat to the stability and system that had allowed 
them to prosper. The tardiness and weakness of the government response spurred much support for 
the Constitutional provisions that strengthened the government. It also prompted Cutler, who 
roundly disparaged the rebellion, to push for the Ohio Company to settle of the land that would 
become known as the Northwest Territory. With Cutler having been a co-founder in March 1786, 
the Ohio Company of Associates, as it formally was known, was a joint-stock outfit of land 
speculators who sought to capitalize on the economic opportunities that lay west of Pennsylvania 
and Virginia. There was a social component as well. 
Contrasting the tumult of Massachusetts with the inchoate west in a 1787 promotional 
pamphlet, Cutler boasted that “there will be no wrong habits to combat and no inveterate systems to 
overturn… no rubbish to remove, before you can lay the foundation.”175 The state of slavery would 
become one of the primary factors differentiating the Ohio Company’s target from the 13 colonies. 
Paul Finkelman has advanced the argument that Congress accepted Dane’s Article VI partly in order 
to satisfy Cutler, whose Ohio Company was poised to purchase upwards of 5 million acres of land 
from the federal government.176 The soundness of this theory is evident when one considers the new 
nation’s finances. In the wake of massive expenditures needed to defeat the British, tax policy in 
response to Massachusetts’ economic straits was the primary trigger for Shays’ Rebellion. The rest of 
the country, meanwhile, was so hamstrung by debt that Alexander Hamilton would launch a radical 
plan for the federal government to assume debts belonging to states so that they would have a better 
shot at financial viability in that most vulnerable stage of the nation’s infancy. An opportunity for a 
financial windfall such as the Ohio Company’s land purchase was highly enticing. 
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Although Rufus Putnam may have been first among equals within Ohio Company 
leadership, it was the amiable and experienced Cutler who was dispatched to New York to open and 
close the deal that ultimately would shape the nation in profound ways. He had a dual mission: to 
buy land and to see to it that the land would be governed and regulated to his liking. Cutler arrived 
on July 5, 1787, and was introduced to various legislators on the floor of Congress as soon as the 
next day.177 Cutler quickly ingratiated himself to a litany of Congressmen, prominent citizens and 
government officials such as Secretary of War Henry Knox. He spent much of his time in the 
subsequent days developing a particularly easy rapport with Southern Congressmen, whose support 
he would need most of all regarding the slavery ban that the Ohio Company sought to effect. He 
mixed business with pleasure, often joining associates new and old on expeditions to peruse the 
town and country.178 
Initially, Cutler found it easier to socialize with his new associates than to lead them to 
common ground on the proposition he had placed before them. He found the Congressmen “so 
wide apart that there seems to be little prospect of closing a contract” on the land sale.179 On July 10, 
Cutler was working the other half of his mission when he asked for and received a draft of the 
Northwest Ordinance – an indicator of just how richly privileged his status suddenly had become - 
and promptly suggested revisions to it. 
Poised to help the federal government with its ailing finances, Cutler was fully aware of the 
leverage he possessed. While the exact nature of his revisions was not recorded, what is known is 
that decades later the Cutler family records turned up a note in which Dane beseeched Cutler to 
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offer his input on the evolving legislation pertaining to religion, education and slavery.180 And what is 
further known is that in his diary entry of July 19, 1787, Cutler wrote that “the amendments I 
proposed have all been made except one,”181 referring to a taxation clause that was rejected. This 
was a lobbying effort that had very nearly reached full fruition. Two days after Cutler passed along 
his desired modifications, Dane submitted the draft of the Ordinance for a vote, having tacked on 
Article VI. The tally was 18 for and none against. If there was any debate or formal discussion about 
the slavery ban, nary a participant made note of it. Cutler, who left New York the day before the 
vote, seems to have been confident about such a swift and smooth resolution. The Freedom 
Ordinance, then, had been ratified to the satisfaction of this lobbyist par excellence – and more 
importantly, it was good enough for the nine Southern Congressmen who voted for it. Finkelman 
attributes this to their general ignorance that slavery already existed in that territory, a state of mind 
that seems improbable given their interest and connections there. The land deal, the very reason that 
had brought Cutler to New York, was another matter entirely.  
It took three weeks for Cutler and Congress to come to terms on the latter half of the quid 
pro quo. This was not for want of utmost effort on Cutler’s part, as he clearly understood the 
magnitude of the task at hand. Having left New York for Philadelphia on July 11, moving between 
the two cities like many legislators that summer, Cutler immediately earned an audience with an elite 
group of Convention delegates including Madison, Mason, Rutledge and Charles Pinckney. Such 
entrée was a telltale indicator of the utmost attention and respect which many in government 
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devoted to Cutler. That initial meeting extended until 1:30 on the morning of July 13, including only 
fellow Bay Staters Elbridge Gerry, Nathaniel Gorham and King by the end.182  
Cutler’s clout and genial personality enabled him to move easily among the delegates despite 
their now-famous vow to maintain secrecy as to the proceedings. He exhausted all of the tools at his 
disposal, flashing his resolve sometimes and deploying his considerable charm on other occasions. 
He dined at legislators’ homes, spent evenings at their boarding houses and attempted to wield 
influence before audiences large and small. Cutler’s diary entry of July 21 details the elaborate 
strategy with which he attempted to curry favor with one legislator, who could in turn be used to 
win over the next and so forth.183 There were several aspects of the land sale that still needed to be 
ironed out – most especially, the size and type of payment the Ohio Company was willing to put 
forth. 
By the waning days of July, Cutler had neared his breaking point. He had nurtured a good 
rapport with many Congressmen since arriving in New York on July 5 but was yet unable to 
capitalize fully on it. Trying to win support back in New York in late July, he was getting nowhere. 
Having declared his intention to leave town straightaway with his money in his pocket, Cutler was 
persuaded by Virginia’s Lee on July 27 to wait until Congress had one more opportunity to discuss 
the matter. Later that day, the drama had abated for the moment. Cutler received word that his 
proposal had been accepted “without the least variation.”184  
The Confederation Congress had acceded to sell 5 million acres of Western land – 30 
percent directly to the Ohio Company and the rest to other well-placed speculators waiting in the 
wings. The agreed-upon amount of $3.5 million was misleading once several mitigating factors were 
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accounted for – much of the payment was to be made in military warrants rather than cash, and an 
allowance was made for potentially infertile or otherwise inhospitable land.185 Thus was 
consummated “one of the great giveaways in American history” as “an almost-bankrupt government 
received only about $42,500 in real money”186 Little wonder that Hamilton, who two years later 
became Washington’s first Secretary of the Treasury, felt compelled to take dramatic steps to 
strengthen the financial foundation of the fledgling country. 
So it was that a small-town pastor, a man lacking both personal fortune and extensive 
personal connections, was able to descend upon the Constitutional Convention and the halls of 
Congress and hold sway over the leaders of the new nation. Cutler dictated the terms of what would 
become one of the most important pieces of legislation in early America, and two weeks later, 
secured a cut-rate price on a massive land acquisition that would shape the future of western 
settlement. Southern intransigence on the slavery issue was exposed not as flimsy, but as finite. The 
Southern Congressmen’s acquiescence to the proscription of slavery in the Northwest Territory is 
proof positive that this issue was not the sine qua non that historians such as Rakove, Bailyn and 
Catherine Drinker Bowen have suggested. 
Part of the Southern willingness to accede to Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance can be 
traced to economic roots. Finkelman has pointed to a letter by a Congressman who sat alongside 
Dane on the committee that drafted the Ordinance.187 On Aug. 8, 1787, William Grayson confessed 
to fellow Virginian James Monroe that the ban was accepted out of Southern self-interest. The 
Ordinance, wrote Grayson, “was agreed to by the Southern members for the purpose of preventing 
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Tobacco and Indigo from being made” outside the South.188 Those crops were so labor-intensive as 
to compel landowners to utilize slaves to tend to them. Without slaves, tobacco and indigo could 
not be grown at a high profit margin. Because Southern farmers had no interest in helping the 
Northwest siphon off market share, they opposed the spread of slavery there. 
Peter Onuf advances another possible explanation for Southern approval of Article VI. 
Stipulating a slavery ban specifically for the Northwest, and only the Northwest, implies its present 
and possibly future legality in other parts of the country. In addition, the Ordinance’s fugitive slave 
clause strengthened the position of Southern slaveholders, particularly in Virginia, which bordered 
three of the five states that would be hewn out of the new land. 189 Again, this would have appealed 
to the self-interest of Southerners – and in effect, set the stage for a similar clause to be added to the 
draft Constitution six weeks later in Philadelphia. Onuf cites this angle as evidence that the 
Ordinance was less than a grand milestone for the anti-slavery movement. To the contrary, it 
corroborates the idea that multiple agendas could be intertwined, compromises could be adopted 
and leverage could be harnessed in reining in slavery during the summer-long discussions at the 
Pennsylvania State House.  
Further, Onuf makes a dubious assertion in stating that it was “unlikely” that all 18 
Congressmen who voted for the Ordinance actually “saw the provision as antislavery.”190 It would 
be more accurate to infer that the legislators did not consider this law a death sentence for the 
institution of slavery. But given the clarity of the language Dane and the committee used - “[t]here 
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shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory” 191 – it remains problematic to 
challenge the meaning of the text itself. It is more reasonable to examine its impact.  
Historians, Finkelman among them, who have tried to substantiate the ineffectiveness of the 
Northwest Ordinance cite the lack of enforcement clauses within Article VI. Parts of the Northwest 
Territory continued to have slavery well after the passage of the law. Part of the lore of Abraham 
Lincoln is that his family did not make a true escape from slave territory when heading north from 
his native Kentucky. When the Lincolns lived in southern Indiana and southern Illinois during the 
third and fourth decades of the 19th century, both areas had extant, albeit small, enslaved 
populations. Other former Northwest Territories did, too: as late as the 1830 census, the 
government counted three slaves in Indiana, six in Ohio, 32 in Michigan and 747 in Illinois,192 where 
pro-slavery factions were especially stubborn.193 Further, it is possible, given slaveowners’ desire not 
to face legal sanction, that the enumeration of enslaved persons produced undercounts. 
There are several reasons for the disparity between the de jure and de facto state of slavery 
there. Many of the Constitutional amendments ratified in the 19th and 20th centuries included a 
clause stipulating that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,” 
but Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance did not.  If the government was not specifically 
authorized to enforce or execute the ban, the odds of such enforcement or execution taking place 
were not high. Article VI was not the only clause whose enforcement provision was lacking. 
Secondly, territorial governor Arthur St. Clair, who served from 1788-1802, was scarcely interested 
in extirpating slavery from his jurisdiction. Conversely, he placed high priority on catering to the 
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interests of white slaveowners in the territory.194 Even under the direction of a motivated executive, 
a nascent government would have had difficulty summoning the resources to root out slavery in a 
new territory that was populated largely by Native Americans, lightly mapped and devoid of local 
officials.  
Legions of questions would long remain unanswered, such as how the government would 
interpret the law vis-à-vis slaveholders who left prior to the Ordinance and then returned. Would 
there be any allowances for the French slaveholders who had lived under French government in 
what was now the Northwest Territory? Would the federal legislature or courts, both of which were 
in a state of transition amid the launch of the Constitution, be able or willing to resolve individual 
disputes regarding slavery? And since slaves had been considered property, what of the property 
rights that were so cherished by many white Americans of the day? This last question informed the 
position of Hamilton and others on slavery, which proved vexing for anti-slavery advocates hoping 
the Ordinance would occasion a sea change. 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 neither wiped the new territory clean of slavery nor 
reshaped the political landscape on slavery issue in any holistic way. Still, the significance of its sixth 
article, added to the legislation in the 11th hour and under a highly unusual set of circumstances, was 
quite meaningful. It discouraged slaveholders from moving into the territory because they found it a 
much safer proposition to stay where slavery was protected than to migrate to an area where it had 
been given a death sentence. It put the slaveholders of the territory on the defensive, forcing them in 
many cases to leave or petition for an indulgence. For slaves living south of the Ohio River, Article 
VI of the Northwest Ordinance turned the territory into somewhat of a promised land, giving rise to 
the Underground Railroad for those who would escape and head north. It separated north from 
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south in a way that would shape the national debate on slavery and ultimately spawn the Civil War. 
In short, it made the boldest and most sweeping statement on slavery of the pre-Constitutional 
period.  
This was an unambiguous law, bereft of qualifiers, exceptions and the gradual phase-in of 
other legislation. This was a law whose purview stretched across a vast expanse of some of the most 
valuable land under American control. And having been approved by a unanimous vote in the 
Confederation Congress, it was proof that the institution of slavery was vulnerable amid the political 
climate of the day. As of July 13, 1787, this was an institution wounded by anti-slavery forces and 
their ability to effect compromise with a willing South. 
5 ENTRENCHMENT: EARLY VICTORIES FOR SLAVERY AT THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
The Articles of Confederation, drafted amid the Revolution’s early stages in 1776-77, had 
been ratified by all 13 state legislatures over the subsequent three-and-one-half years. Realizing that 
achieving sovereignty was less a finish line than a starting point, many colonists, particularly in the 
political and merchant classes, grew vexed by a raft of issues such as defense, commerce, sovereignty 
and governance. Underlying it all was what David O. Stewart calls a “monetary anarchy” that 
prevailed by the middle of the 1780s.195 And while the financial woes were pressing, they were 
accompanied by ever-present concerns about the vulnerability of being surrounded by British, 
French, Spanish and Native American neighbors. Americans had no shortage of reasons for seeking 
improvements to the system of government. Several years of growing pains had provided the 
impetus for the colonies to send delegates to Philadelphia in May of 1787. 
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 Slavery was on the front burner of the Constitutional Convention from the start, either as an 
explicit agenda item or as subtext. It was on June 11, roughly two weeks after the de facto 
commencement of the Convention, that the delegates first considered the three-fifths compromise 
that would ignominiously treat slaves as a fraction of a human being in terms of political status.  In 
the subsequent three months, nearly every issue on the delegates’ expansive table went through 
alterations, iterations and reconfigurations; all manner of proposals were floated as to the very 
nature of the chief executive, the structure of the legislature, the rights to be held by citizens and the 
format of elections, among other matters. Motions to authorize Congress to appoint the President, 
an idea which seems radical to modern American sensibilities, were passed on five occasions.196 In 
the subsequent three months, nearly everything changed - and changed a great deal. Everything but 
the three-fifths compromise. The preeminent way slavery was addressed by the new nation had 
inexplicably been set in stone. 
When the convention adjourned in mid-September, the Constitution’s fate having been cast 
to the winds and whims of the 13 states, one of its foundational pillars was the concept that slavery 
would not only be permitted, it would be protected in the representation scheme that formed the 
backbone of the government’s new structure. By July 12, the fateful compromise had been sealed, 
yielding a burst of conspicuous phrasing that with only slight changes would be consecrated in a 
most prominent and symbolic location four scant paragraphs after the Preamble. In Ellsworth’s 
words, 
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“the rule of contribution by direct taxation for the support of the 
Government of the U. States shall be the number of white inhabitants, and 
three fifths of every other description in the several States.”197 
 The Constitution would be celebrated upon its ratification with parades, speeches and song, 
in a state-by-state eruption of patriotic ardor over the next two-and-one-half years.198 For more than 
two centuries hence, it would be praised, admired and even copied by other nations. And enshrined 
at its core was a sanction of slavery. Five provisions of the Constitution – Art. 1, Sec. 2, Par. 3; Art. 
I, Sec. 9, Par. 1; Art. I, Sec. 9, Par. 4; Art. IV, Sec. 2, Par. 3; and Art. V – explicitly protect slavery 
and several others implicitly safeguard either the institution or the trade.199 
 Emerging at a time when many states had been legislating a retreat from slavery, this 
outcome was anything but a foregone conclusion. In fact, there was ample reason at the 
Convention’s onset to envisage threats to slavery’s legality on the state, regional and national levels. 
Public and private threats to slavery were commonplace in the Revolutionary Era. Although 
Matthew Mason overreaches with his claim that “the Revolution bequeathed a dislike for slavery to 
almost every Northerner,”200 it was clear that the Enlightenment ethos of natural rights influenced 
many Americans’ conception of what liberty was and ought to be places. 
  In the wake of the wartime tumult of the Revolution, the stability of the institution of 
slavery had been shaken considerably, and the nation had yet to find equilibrium. Anti-slavery laws 
had been passed, private manumissions had occurred and religious opposition to slavery was gaining 
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traction. Thirty-two years after the Convention, Madison wrote a letter to American diplomat 
Robert Walsh reflecting on the anti-slavery climate surrounding that seminal event. As Madison saw 
it, "(t)he African trade in slaves had long been odious to most of the States, and the importation of 
slaves into them had been prohibited."201 
 Slavery had long been evaluated through an array of economic and social perspectives, but 
when the delegates gathered in Philadelphia, what was at stake most of all was political power. At 
the time of the Convention, none of the 13 state legislatures was based on a representation scheme 
that counted slaves. Not New Hampshire, with its paucity of enslaved persons. Not Virginia, the 
Old Dominion so heavily reliant on slaves that it had almost as many people in bondage as the three 
next-highest states combined.202 Slaves lived in each of the 13 states, but not a single one of the 
states considered its enslaved population for representational purposes. “If Negroes are not 
represented in the States to which they belong,” wondered New Jersey’s William Paterson at the 
Convention, “why should they be represented in the Genl. Government?”203 After all, as Paterson 
pointed out, representation is a means to exert the will of the people, but slaves were presumed to 
have no political will or voice. Yet when the delegates convened in Philadelphia, a new political 
philosophy materialized regarding representation, a philosophy that like Athena emerged fully 
formed and plenipotent. At the Convention, it was not long before a representation system 
including slaves was pushed to the front of the agenda, empowering those states that soon would 
double down on slavery. Slaves would count. And slave states would benefit. 
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 One of the Convention’s stiffest challenges, the settling of the representation question has 
been interpreted a variety of ways. Rakove sees the three-fifths compromise as “the closest 
approximation in the Constitution to the principle of one person, one vote,”204 given that the issue’s 
starting point was the nonexistence of political representation for slaves in any state legislature. 
Unfazed by the inconsistency of slaves counting for representation without being eligible to vote, 
Wood defends the three-fifths compromise as reasonable in part because women and children were 
also non-voters who were represented. There is no denying it was a grand compromise. The other 
pole of the Convention debate had been staked out by Pierce Butler, whose proposal that blacks 
fully count was backed by his own South Carolina, Georgia and Delaware. Goldstone argues that 
Delaware supported the proposal so as to increase opposition to the Constitution and the likelihood 
of retaining the Articles of Confederation.205 That moribund set of laws provided for representation 
on an egalitarian basis for each state, irrespective of population. The Constitution could have done 
the same. Although Southwestern expansion would have benefited slaveholding states in such a 
system, the existing Southern states generally opposed it – in the case of Madison and Edmund 
Randolph, because it would have negated Virginia’s influence amid the emergence of other, smaller 
states.206 Garry Wills joins Waldstreicher and Davis in asserting that embedding the enslaved 
population into a representation scheme profoundly empowered the South for decades,207 although 
Earl Maltz holds that the eventual plan for the Electoral College was less favorable to the South than 
other proposals that had been considered.208 
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The three-fifths compromise was not part of the Articles of Confederation, though it was 
very nearly so. After James Madison proposed such a representation scheme in 1783, 11 states 
approved it but were not joined by New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Since the Articles of 
Confederation required unanimous consent among the states to amend it, the proposition died, 
leaving untouched the original plan basing representation solely on land values. Such a land-based 
scheme – not a population-based calculation - was indeed the starting point for discussions at the 
Convention. 
The Northwest Ordinance had been passed under the Articles of Confederation, the first set 
of laws that the new nation adopted. Adopted in 1777 but not fully ratified until 1781, the Articles 
of Confederation provided for a fledgling government that pointedly lacked much of the power that 
had aggrieved so many colonists while under British rule. This new set of laws did not stipulate 
much in the way of specific governmental powers or citizens’ rights, and it essentially ignored the 
issue of slavery. The Articles of Confederation neither allowed nor disallowed slavery. With priority 
given to state sovereignty, the national government’s de jure position on the issue was one of 
neutrality and deference. States were free to legislate slavery as they saw fit.  
This deference ultimately was a boon to the anti-slavery cause because, in a country where 
forced labor always had been legal, it left the door open for oppositional action. In no way were 
slaveholding interests entitled or empowered by the Articles of Confederation. The Articles’ lack of 
a fugitive slave clause, which was later included in the Constitution, meant that no state was 
compelled to support or aid slaveholders. This is not to say that masters of runaway slaves 
experienced systematic lack of cooperation from northern entities, whether state governments, local 
governments or individuals. Yet it is of considerable significance that such assistance was not 
mandated. Those who opposed slavery were not legally bound to defer to those who supported it.  
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 Amid this legal landscape, the institution of slavery was being hindered and hurt. As detailed 
in Chapter 2, eleven of the 13 states had banned the importation of slaves. Vermont’s founding 
Constitution of 1777 had enacted a partial ban on slavery. Pennsylvania approved gradual abolition 
in 1780, four years before Rhode Island and Connecticut followed suit. And in the several years 
following the Quock Walker court cases of 1781, slavery in Massachusetts died off rapidly, officially 
ceasing to exist by the time of the first federal census in 1790. While slavery was increasing 
throughout most of the Americas, it was under duress in the United States. The very war that 
birthed the nation had helped to roil the inertia of the slave system. And in July of 1787, it suffered 
its biggest blow with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance. The opponents of slavery were 
scoring victories and gaining momentum across the 13 states. 
 This was the climate in which 40-odd delegates huddled in the Pennsylvania State House 
from May to September of 1787. Their express objective was to revise the Articles of Confederation, 
but they swiftly steered the agenda to replacing it. In doing so, the Convention delegates would 
profoundly shape the nation in untold ways, not least of which was to make it possible for slavery to 
proliferate in such a way that it would dominate the economic and political landscape for the better 
part of the century to come. The momentum and strength of the anti-slavery movement absorbed a 
major blow from which it would take over 40 years to recover. 
 The Convention was to begin on May 14, 1787, but with only eight delegates having 
materialized at the State House, it would not be until late in the month that business began in 
earnest.209 The delegates, who trickled in as fast as their transport and varying senses of urgency 
would allow, did stake out important ground in the early going. The Committee on Rules, consisting 
of George Wythe, Charles Pinckney and Hamilton, delivered 21 rules on May 28-29, including a host 
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of procedural stipulations and the famous code of silence to which all delegates generally adhered 
throughout the summer.210 The next day, six of the eight states with sufficient representation 
approved the proposal to form a government with three branches, legislative, executive and judicial, 
and on May 31, the delegates agreed that the legislature would have two chambers.211 The next 10 
days saw discussion and decisions on fundamental issues pertaining to the structure, powers and 
election of the three branches. Several proposals seem radical in hindsight: that the state executives 
choose the national executive, that the first chamber of the legislature should elect the second, that 
the national legislature would be able to reject any state law, that the executive serve one seven-year 
term. The delegates even needed debate and discussion to settle on a single, rather than multiple 
executive. It was clear from the early days of the Convention that everything was on the table. 
 On June 11, the Convention took its first foray into the issue of slavery. Harkening to a 
failed 1783 amendment to the Articles of Confederation, Pennsylvania’s James Wilson suggested 
that representation in the first legislative chamber be based on the free population of each state plus 
three-fifths of its enslaved population.212  That this was an entreaty for southern support was a bit 
ironic, given the history of such a convoluted calculation. Under the Articles of Confederation, the 
formula was to be used to determine each state’s tax burden, and since the states naturally sought as 
light a contribution as possible, slaveholding states were reluctant to sign up for any plan that would 
increase it. Southerner states initially proposed a 2:1 or 4:1 ratio of enslaved to free people to 
counter the North’s suggested 4:3 ratio. Madison broached a compromise calculation of 5:3 that 
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would satisfy both regions.213 Ultimately, the South shifted on the issue, voting in support for that 
amendment; it was New Hampshire and New York whose opposition prevented the unanimous 
vote required at the time. At the Constitutional Convention four years later, it was the northerner 
Wilson - a richly learned scholar and staunch patriot becoming one of the most impactful voices at 
the Convention – who brought to the table the formulation that would evolve into one of the most 
potent catalysts for the expansion of slavery. Wilson, who spoke against slavery for years after the 
Convention, shared the resolve of many delegates who placed consensus above all else.  
With South Carolina’s Pinckney having seconded Wilson’s motion, there immediately 
emerged a north-south axis of support, the likes of which would be the backbone of slavery-related 
matters throughout the summer. Dissent was equally quick to appear. Massachusetts’ Elbridge Gerry 
wasted no time in defying the three-fifths proposition. Characteristically provocative, Gerry 
challenged the logic that “the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of 
representation more than Cattle and horses of the North.”214 He knew the South wanted to have its 
cake and eat it, too, and he wasn’t having it. If slaveholding states were credited for what they 
considered property, all states should be able to do the same. And if that were the case, the South 
instantly would lose any legislative advantage it hoped to glean from its enslaved population. The 
votes made this scenario moot. Wilson’s proposal was approved 9-2, with New Jersey and Delaware 
casting the no votes.215  
Although it would be debated in various contexts for the next two months, the ratio of 
“three fifths of all other persons” was there to stay, marking the first of many times that slavery 
                                                 
213 S. Mintz and S. McNeil, “The Three-Fifths-Compromise,” last modified 2014, accessed June 30, 2015, 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=163.  
214 James Madison, “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention: June 11,” The Avalon Project: 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_611.asp. Accessed June 
29, 2015. 
215 Madison, “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention: July 2,” 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_611.asp Accessed June 29, 2015. 
79 
would be protected at the Convention. The word “slavery” never was written into the Constitution, 
but this was stylistic sleight of hand. In debate after debate, vote after vote, delegates were 
comfortable treating slavery as a front-burner issue to be dissected from multiple perspectives, but 
the delegates time and again opted to soften its edge with vague phrasing, euphemisms and allusions. 
This had the net effect of creating the illusion of a document that was not undergirded with 
approval of and leeway for the institution of slavery. It was easier on the delegates’ conscience, and 
given Jefferson’s and Franklin’s message management abroad during the Revolutionary War, may 
have been a way to avoid alienating French support. 
On June 12, the day after the three-fifths ratio appeared at the Convention, a 7-4 vote 
approved the election of the legislature’s first chamber to three-year terms. Gerry thought this too 
infrequent, stemming from the same fear of tyranny that arose in him when considering the 
prospect of a hereditary executive. 216 His Massachusetts colleague, Nathaniel Gorham, was given 
similar pause, along with the delegations from Connecticut and both Carolinas. But the measure had 
ample support, passing with a 7-4 vote. And on the question of term length for the second chamber, 
the proposal of seven years was supported by eight states, with two split and one opposed.217 Both 
chambers’ term length was reduced by one year later that summer, which, again, suggests that 
nothing was written in stone. Decisions were never final, despite protestations and proclamations to 
the contrary. 
In fact, there was no small number of matters that took long, winding roads to their final 
resting place within the Constitution. It was amid this climate of brainstorming and bartering that 
the agenda turned again to slavery, one month to the day after Wilson had introduced the three-
fifths ratio. It was halfway through the Convention and a critical moment had arrived in the life 
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cycle of slavery in the United States. On July 11, Pinckney and Pierce Butler, also of South Carolina, 
moved to jettison the three-fifths ratio in favor of counting enslaved people as fully as any other. 
Gerry insisted that three-fifths was as much weight as could be given to slaves,218 because in every 
other way they were legally considered to be of a lesser class than whites. Gorham was in agreement. 
It was at this point that some of the more innovative and provocative arguments enlivened the State 
House. 
Butler, though he was a minor player throughout much of the summer, stood up here in a 
major way to protect his own interests and those of his fellow South Carolinian elites. A very 
wealthy individual with vast slaveholdings, Butler could speak from first-hand knowledge on the 
slave economy.  And since the question was one of fairness, he tried to convince the delegates that 
race or status had nothing to do with it. According to Madison’s notes, Butler “insisted that the 
labour of a slave in S. Carola. was as productive & valuable as that of a freeman in Massts., that as 
wealth was the great means of defence and utility to the Nation they were equally valuable to it with 
freemen.”219 A laborer was a laborer, in Butler’s view, be he free or enslaved, Northern or Southern. 
Amid a lack of consensus as to how a state’s population ought to be calculated, Butler sought to 
shift the discourse away from partial representation and toward full representation of enslaved 
people. 
At first blush, this seems a fascinating and contorted contention from a man whose 
livelihood was predicated on the buying, selling, ownership and control of human beings who were 
not considered whites’ peers in any way. But at the same time, this proposal may not have been as 
much of a philosophical departure as it appeared, for Butler was among the many Framers whose 
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views on slavery were conflicted. One Butler scholar likens the statesman to Washington and 
Jefferson in that for him, slavery was “not only contrary to his principles but also an infernal 
nuisance.”220 Butler, too, faced the epochal struggle of reconciling the multiple realities at play - 
economics, social climate, personal beliefs, legal strictures. In writing letters to “radical” friends from 
Britain and his native Ireland, Butler criticized slavery as immoral and unjust, contrasting it with the 
ideals behind the founding of the United States. He even echoed Washington’s approach in terms of 
the most feasible solution. Rather than trusting slavery to die an organic death over time, as 
predicted and desired by Jefferson and others, Butler saw the most wisdom in a simple 
governmental solution: abolition.221 The Convention, however, did not strike him as the right time 
and place for that. 
After Butler shared his proposal for full representation of enslaved people, Mason countered 
with a rejoinder that once again gives the lie to representations of the south as a pro-slavery bloc of 
political bedfellows. In short, Mason said he could not concur with Butler’s plan even though it 
would significantly advantage his beloved Virginia and the rest of the South. Mason conceded that 
slaves were an engine of economic production, and in truth it would have been folly for anyone 
North or South to deny that. But he went further. Mindful of the Revolutionary War that had ended 
just four years prior, he acknowledged that the money slaves helped generate could be used to 
support the military. This was a major consideration for a nation vulnerable to foreign incursion and 
domestic unrest, whether in the vein of Shays’ Rebellion or in the form of a slave insurrection. Still, 
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there was something holding Mason back. He said he “could not however regard them as equal to 
freemen and could not vote for them [to be understood] as such.”222  
There was no ostensible reason for a Southern slaveholding politician not to support Butler’s 
proposition. It would have given the South an immediate increase in legislative clout, which would 
have been parlayed into untold benefits in the political and economic spheres. Since the question of 
how to choose the chief executive still hung in the air, more Congressional representation for the 
South even could have dictated who ended up as President. Mason, himself a slaveholder, did not 
ignore any of those factors. His opposition to full representation of slaves had much to do with his 
own torn conscience. As evidenced by his staunch advocacy of a ban on slavery importation, Mason 
simply was not comfortable with the prospect of the new nation doubling down on slavery. In 
addition, as Van Cleve has argued, Virginia could stand to stanch the influx of slaves in a way that 
states with smaller enslaved populations could not. Further, Carl Van Doren points out that the rice 
cultivation popular in South Carolina and Georgia had higher mortality rates than Virginia 
agriculture, which constricted those two Deep South states’ ability to depend on natural increase to 
sustain their slave demography.  
The day imports ended would be the day Virginia’s relative position grew even stronger. For 
this reason Peter Wallenstein argues that Mason “acted in behalf of Virginia slaveholders, not 
Virginia slaves” with his opposition to importation.223 Still, as the nation collectively faced forward, 
with the Southwest’s plantation-ready conditions an element of anyone’s vision of the future, any 
limitation on the institution of slavery should be seen as a step away from strengthening and 
protecting it. Mason fought for such a limitation. 
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The vote on Butler’s motion was 7-3 against, with only Delaware, Georgia and South 
Carolina advocating full representation of enslaved persons. Massachusetts’ Gorham and North 
Carolina’s Hugh Williamson said that in light of previous debates, they were willing to support the 
three-fifths ratio. All sides realized that each delegation seemed to be playing the same game: 
pushing for one representation formula on certain measures but backing another when a different 
matter was pending. Principles were adaptable, flexible. They changed along with the shifting sands 
of political expediency. It was at this point that Morris, like Gerry a consistent anti-slavery presence 
on the State House floor, began to engage in a three-day showdown in which he would give all he 
had to shape the slavery debate. 
Like the other delegates, Morris could see the way that the issue of slavery was being twisted 
and turned depending on the particular angle of the day’s discussion. He pointed out that if slaves 
were considered to be inhabitants in a representation scheme, most of the northern states would not 
support it. And if slaves were considered to be a form of wealth for taxation purposes, the southern 
states would not stand for that. Were other revenue-generating types of property to be taxed as 
wealth? Morris asked, “[W]hy is no other wealth but slaves included?”224 He was unwilling to equate 
population with strength, either. Unlike many other delegates, who only selectively drew lessons 
from their experience under Great Britain’s rule, Morris reminded the Framers that the enemy’s 
numerical superiority during the Revolution hardly translated to superiority. 
After Morris’ lengthy speech, King credited him with having made abundant sense. Then 
King said he would “accede to the proposition for the sake of doing something.”225 This conciliatory 
spirit, although rarely articulated as such in the relatively few notes the delegates left behind, seemed 
commonplace, and borne of pragmatism and fatigue amid a relentless string of negotiations. King’s 
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approach falls under what David Waldstreicher referred to as delegates’ willingness to stomach flaws 
in the Constitution so as to continue progress toward the ultimate goal of ratification. 
Meanwhile, Rutledge hedged. He proposed that after the legislature’s first session and 
periodically thereafter, each state’s representation be reallocated based on wealth and population. 
That wasn’t concrete enough for Mason’s liking. Other delegates spoke up, generally questioning the 
practicability of the propositions on the table, and then Morris jumped in again, questioning how the 
Convention’s decisions would stand up as the country evolved and grew. And thinking of the people 
in his adopted home of Pennsylvania, where a gradual emancipation law had been passed in 1780, he 
said they “would revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves.”226 This was not, however, 
the endorsement of slavery it appears to be. 
Morris knew that if there was to be slavery, inferiority was implicit. Here was one of many 
instances in which the transplanted New Yorker, whose 173 known Convention speeches outpaced 
every other delegate’s, would not brook hypocrisy. Morris consistently denounced slavery and in this 
moment was attempting to goad delegates into considering abolition. If Southern states wanted 
more representation, they could have it – provided they ended slavery. What they could not do, in 
Morris’ mind, was to support gross, systematic inequality but at the same time petition for granting 
slaves one sliver of political equality in terms of their apportionment value. 
Many delegates had qualms about the representation scheme and how it would serve the 
country given the way migration to the south and west was widely expected to continue. Debate 
continued as to the merits of assessing taxes or devising representation schemes based on wealth or 
population. But King was one who was fixed on the particular aspect of slave representation. 
Although he had pledged to remain open to all matters pending before the Convention, he drew a 
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hard line on this one. King thought it an outrage on behalf of the northern states that the south 
would be handed any degree of influence and power on account of their enslaved population. He 
cited the temporary representation allotments that were being bandied about and insisted that the 
South was overcompensated. Sherman rebutted that Georgia was the only case where that was true, 
which did not bother him because its population was on the rise. Like a child growing into a too-
large shoe, Georgia soon would earn its generous apportionment. Madison’s notes reveal that 
Sherman, who repeatedly was willing to ally with the South for the sake of compromise, may have 
felt it necessary to yield ground on this issue; “[i]n general the allotment might not be just, but 
considering all circumstances, he was satisfied with it.”227 Here Sherman aligns with the mindset 
identified by Eric Slauter, who cites in the Constitution’s backers an emphasis on its virtues rather 
than a tendency to be waylaid by its “putative deformities.”228 
Gorham recalled that, during debates over the Articles of Confederation, the citizens of 
Massachusetts objected to full representation of enslaved people, which they saw as hypocritical. He 
predicted similar opposition in this circumstance. As for Wilson, he echoed Morris’ umbrage with 
the ideologically unsound alternatives that were presented: various proposals would have classified 
slaves as wealth, property or perhaps a citizen with some degree of rights. But like Sherman, Wilson 
thought compromise was the order of the day. He fought the issue no more. Morris, on the other 
hand, was steadfast, acknowledging that he was compelled to “do injustice” either to the South or to 
“human nature,” and that he chose the former. Morris said “he could never agree to give such 
encouragement to the slave trade as would be given by allowing them a representation for their 
negroes.”229 Aware of the ramifications of such a stance, he conceded that the South would never 
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ratify the Constitution absent protections for the slave trade. In an atmosphere where principles 
were sacrificed at the altar of compromise, Morris sacrificed nothing. And on this day, he was not 
alone.  
The vote to use the three-fifths ratio in Congressional representation was rejected 6-4 on 
July 11. Connecticut lined up alongside Georgia, Virginia and North Carolina as three-fifths 
advocates, while South Carolina, likely holding out for full representation, sided with the majority.230 
Three southern states, whose delegations consistently had voted to steer more clout to the south, 
were willing to back off the hard line that South Carolina drew. This was yet another example of the 
South being more philosophically diverse and more politically flexible than is typically argued. There 
were times when the southern states stood together and times when they did not. The great wall of 
inveterate support for slavery was gapped and cracked. 
Day 2 of the three-day showdown on slavery featured another ultimatum.  This time it came 
by the hand of William Davie of North Carolina. Davie, who ended up leaving Philadelphia one 
month before the Convention adjourned, was alarmed at the desire among Morris and others to 
disallow representation of slaves. He spoke on behalf of his state’s delegation in saying that it would 
never sign the Constitution if it featured anything less than three-fifths representation for enslaved 
people: “If the Eastern States meant to exclude them alltogether (sic) the business was at an end.”231 
This sort of categorical declaration was made on several occasions throughout the summer but 
never carried out. 
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While it cannot be asserted that it was impossible for state delegations to leave, what can be 
said with certainty is that it never happened. There were individual delegates who left, to be sure; 
sixteen of the 55 delegates took their leave of Philadelphia days, weeks or months before the 
September 17 signing.232 Aside from those who departed due to circumstances at home, those who 
vacated the Convention for philosophical reasons did so because of an accumulation of issues rather 
than one utterly radioactive one. And there were some 19 individuals who, after being tapped as 
delegates by their state legislature, decided not to join the proceedings at all. Patrick Henry, 
famously, declined his invitation because he “smelt a rat,” and maintained his opposition by fighting 
against ratification in Virginia. As far as entire state delegations, though, none withdrew as a whole; 
Rhode Island came closest, it can be argued, by refusing to send a delegation, which explains why 
only 12 states are represented among the 39 Framers who signed the Constitution. Davie’s 
ultimatum was likely a bluff. 
William Samuel Johnson, known to tread the middle of the road throughout his political 
career, followed Davie’s dramatic proclamation with a show of support for his southern allies. Like 
Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, his more high-profile Connecticut colleagues, Johnson 
prioritized unity among the states above other issues such as slavery. He acknowledged the variety of 
representation schemes that had been broached and insisted at this point that the best course was to 
agree that slaves should be represented – to what degree would be settled later.  
Morris then spoke up with a direct attack on the rationale Sherman had put forth the day 
before. By now establishing himself as the Convention’s most strident opponent of slavery, Morris 
skewered the suggestion that Northern states would purport to know what the South would or 
would not do. If Southern delegates wanted to deliver an ultimatum, a la Davie, let them do so. Or 
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more accurately, Morris sought to make them do so, rather than presuming to speak for them or 
infer their stance on the issue. Morris proclaimed that he sought to join with any states that wanted 
to confederate; those who opted not to join could carve their own path. 
It is the prospect of losing states that hit hardest in Philadelphia. Just four years removed 
from the Treaty of Paris granting independence from Britain, the Americans already had weathered 
substantial turmoil. There was economic hardship borne of debt from the Revolutionary War. States 
undercut each other on trade matters and agreed on little when it came to questions of sovereignty. 
There was the ever-present possibility of incursion by Spain from the west and south and Britain 
from the north, in addition to the threat of conflict with Native Americans in the Northwest 
Territory and elsewhere. Undergirding all of these dynamics was the fundamental, constant struggle 
of a federal government that needed the states to fall in line – economically, militarily, politically - 
but lacked the power to compel it. This became the primary objective of the Annapolis Convention 
in September 1786 and the resultant decision to have the states send delegates to Philadelphia the 
following May. 
After Morris threw down the gauntlet, several legislators from north and south – Pinckney, 
Ellsworth, Butler, Randolph, Wilson – tried to reach an accord on the question of slave 
representation and how it would stand the test of time. King, who helped birth the anti-slavery 
provision of the Northwest Ordinance and would fight against slavery for decades after the 
Convention, was troubled by what he foresaw as the future of such a representation scheme.233 It is 
difficult to tell how seriously King took Davie’s secession threat, but it clearly grabbed his attention 
and compelled him to fear what such a stance would augur when the South inevitably had more 
population, representation and power. Wondered King, “If they threaten to separate now in case 
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injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force shall back their 
demands[?]. Even in the intervening period, there will no point of time at which they will not be able 
to say, do us justice or we will separate.”234 While the South may not have negotiated from a position 
of great strength in 1787, King knew the region’s leverage would only increase.  
The strength of states and regions remained central to the agenda when the delegates 
convened the next day, July 13. When the question came up as to calculating representation in the 
second branch of the legislature, Morris revisited his claim that it was incoherent to consider slaves 
as wealth-generating property as well as full citizens for the purposes of legislative apportionment. 
He confessed he reluctantly had abandoned his belief that the North and South were more alike 
than different; for one, the South would “not be satisfied unless” a foundation were laid for it to 
dominate the legislature in the future.235 What this shift would entail, in Morris’ view, was a transfer 
of power from shipping and commercial concerns to the agricultural interests that would 
predominate in the South and on the Western frontier. This concern loomed even larger given the 
events of that very day. One hundred miles away, the Confederation Congress voted to enact the 
Northwest Ordinance with its provisions for incorporating new states. Highly attuned to regional 
balance, Morris opposed the admission of western states on an equal footing with the original 13 on 
the grounds that they would not provide a suitable caliber of representative.236 By July 13, when the 
Ordinance was passed, this opposition had become moot. Looking toward the west was not an 
abstraction. It was reality, and it had arrived.  
Morris’ other concerns, of course, were far from being resolved. When it came to guarding 
against Southern dominance, he thought the least of the evils was to accept equal representation in 
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the legislature’s second chamber. This was a substantial concession for a dyed-in-the-wool big-stater; 
Morris represented one big state (Pennsylvania) and had been born and raised in another (New 
York.) If regional demands truly were insatiable, though, Morris said he would meet Davie’s 
ultimatum with one of his own: “let us at once take a friendly leave of each other.”237 Nine weeks 
into the Convention, suggesting its dissolution was not a serious proposition, but it was as much as 
indicator of Morris’ resolve as Davie’s ultimatum was of his. Morris knew the regions would have to 
temper the relentless pursuit of security for their own concerns – the North primarily with its 
“fishery” and the South for its “peculiar objects,” or slaves – else intersectional feuding was sure to 
follow.238 Morris concluded his impassioned argument by warning of the risk of war with Spain. The 
South and West would instigate it, desirous of control of the Mississippi River, but the Northern and 
middle states, with more of an orientation toward the Atlantic Ocean, would have to fight it. The 
prospect of such a conflict was no small concern for a nation fresh off war with another European 
power. And for it to unfold according to Morris’ prediction was no small concern for the Northern 
and middle states. 
Butler confessed to the South’s insistence on protecting its slaves such that the government 
would not take them away, and admitted that he, too, foresaw population growth for the Carolinas 
and Georgia. Wilson echoed the latter sentiment and challenged delegates from every region to think 
about the true meaning of fairness.239 If certain states should grow, they would deserve more power. 
If that meant a comparative disadvantage for states that remained smaller, so be it. Clinging to status 
or influence of the past, Wilson asserted, was selfish and counterproductive. Things change. 
                                                 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
91 
The summer’s most pivotal question of fairness – that of the legislative structure - was soon 
answered. On July 16, the so-called Connecticut Compromise, nicknamed in honor of Sherman’s 
and Ellsworth’s efforts to implement it, was approved, establishing a bicameral legislature that would 
feature proportional representation in one chamber and equal representation in the other. 
Representation in the lower house would be based largely on number of inhabitants - but three-
fifths of enslaved inhabitants.240 Southerners like Butler who had pushed a hard line did not attain 
their objective of full representation, but as far as compromises go, it was unmistakably the North 
that came up short. This compromise not only empowered the South on the spot; Southwestern 
population growth lined up the votes to enable nation-changing triumphs such as the Missouri 
Compromise, the Mexican-American War, and the election of eight Southern men among the first 
12 presidents elected. Ripple effects such as these corroborate Finkelman’s assertion that the three-
fifths compromise had a devastating impact that rode the wave of Southwestern population 
expansion.241 
One of the summer’s highest hurdles had been cleared, relieving an impasse that for a time 
had seemed likely to derail the Convention entirely. Other sticking points, remained, however. 
Agreement on how to handle the issue of slavery was a long way off.  
6 CAPITULATION: NORTHERN DELEGATES YIELD AGAIN 
The Convention was in recess from July 27 to Aug. 5, and when the delegates reassembled, 
the Committee of Detail issued a slate of provisions that made their way into the final version six 
weeks later. Much of the structure of the three branches was set; many of their powers and 
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procedures had been determined. Included was a clause that guaranteed the forced return to his 
home state of a person who was fleeing from “justice,” per the demand of that state’s executive. 
This would be used in part to justify the apprehension of fugitive slaves. 
The subject of slavery did not get another substantial airing until August 8, when King 
questioned the propriety of including slaves in any representation calculus. Aware that the issue 
already had been dissected at length, he explained his relative reticence with the curious theory that 
letting things play out would have helped solidify confidence in the government. To the contrary, 
King could see that dissension and tension still ran high. Many in the State House seemed to be 
opposed to ceasing slave importation, and to make matters worse, those assembled seemed similarly 
reluctant to tax exports. This was King at his most pragmatic. If slavery were to be permitted, he 
thought it would make sense for the government to benefit from it. Taxing exports would generate 
revenue the government could use to put down slave rebellions, the specter of which was as 
terrifying as ever. But the South was poised to have its cake and eat it, too – perpetuating slavery, 
importing more slaves, parlaying them into more political representation and paying not a dime for 
the exports they generated. King was flabbergasted. An ultimatum of sorts: “There was so much 
inequality and unreasonableness in all this, that the people of the Northern States could never be 
reconciled to it. No candid man could undertake to justify it to them.”242 Then, speaking for himself, 
King stipulated that he never could stand for it. 
Sherman, while pointing out his own opposition to slavery, stifled this avenue of debate by 
observing that it would be imprudent to revisit a representation question that already had been 
settled. Morris, perhaps emboldened by King’ stand, was undeterred. He delivered one of the 
Convention’s most strident critiques of slavery, rivaled only by George Mason’s on August 22.  
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Morris attacked slavery from multiple angles. First, as an unconscionable moral evil – 
“nefarious,” according to Madison’s notes of the speech.  But more than that, Morris tried to 
convince the delegates of the ill effects of slavery on society, not just on the enslaved people. 
Describing the institution as “the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed,” Morris 
expounded on the differences one noticed when passing into areas rife with slavery.243 As Mason 
had pointed out as early as a public paper he wrote in 1765, these areas were undeveloped, poor and 
devoid of the trappings of progress.244 Morris also reprised the argument he and King had made 
earlier, challenging the coherence of the delegates who wavered between considering slaves citizens 
for one purpose and a special type of property for another. To protect slavery was to cultivate 
aristocracy, which the delegates ostensibly would condemn. Morris railed against slave importation, 
which depended on snatching people from their home “in defiance of the most sacred laws of 
humanity.”245 Compounding the offense was the obligation of the Northern states to support the 
Southern states in quelling slave insurrections, while the South would evade much of the tax burden 
it rightfully should have borne. Morris ended his harangue by declaring he would rather pay a tax to 
help manumit all the slaves in the United States than to burden the new nation with a Constitution 
as presently conceived. This was a bold statement, to be sure, and not a wholly serious one, but 
certainly was indicative of the strength of Morris’ feelings. 
New Jersey’s Jonathan Dayton spoke up on one of the few occasions all summer to express 
agreement with Morris. Although a slaveholder himself, Dayton knew that he represented a state 
where slavery was on the way out. He also thought it proper that he share his views even though he 
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believed them to be contrary to those of his state’s delegation – David Brearly, William C. Houston, 
William Paterson and William Livingston. Sherman once again defused the anti-slavery perspective, 
and this time he was supported by Pinckney’s claim that “fisheries” and the “Western frontier” 
encumbered the nation to a greater degree than slavery did.246 Morris’ motion to have representation 
based on the number of free inhabitants was rejected 10-1, with only New Jersey in support. 
August 21 saw a surge from the few delegates still charged to weaken the institution of slavery. 
When the Convention revisited the issue of taxing exports, which was not terribly popular at any 
point during the summer, it was inevitable that the discussion would turn to slavery, which made 
possible a large portion of the country’s exports. The characteristic North-South division was 
rendered irrelevant given the salience of other factors, such as the location and trade profile of each 
state, and each delegate’s stance on the degree of power befitting the national government.  
Luther Martin seized the occasion to advocate the insertion of language that would allow a ban 
on slave importation or, at the very least, a tax on it. He cited the three-fifths ratio as an 
“encouragement” to the slave trade and sought a counter to it. A devout states-rights advocate, he 
also shared Mason’s objection to the military burden that would fall to the North on the occasion of 
slave insurrection. Foremost among his concerns was the nature of slavery itself, given the ideals 
that had midwifed the birth of the nation. The protection of slavery in the Constitution as presently 
drafted was, according to Martin, “inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and 
dishonorable to the American character.”247 Here Martin, a slaveholder from a state largely 
dependent on slavery, sounded a note similar to that of the staunchest Northern abolitionist.  
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Marylanders’ and Virginians’ entreaties for a ban on slave importation are often plumbed for 
ulterior motives by historians such as George William Van Cleve. The auspicious slave demography 
in the Chesapeake region prompted its elite to look forward to a time when other Southern states, 
prevented from importing slaves, were hindered from competing successfully.248 Relegated to natural 
increase, Virginia and Maryland would be in a stronger position than states with smaller or older 
enslaved populations. The limitation of Van Cleve’s argument is that it does not fully explain the 
stand Martin took at this juncture of the Convention. Martin was not making an economic, legal or 
sectional argument. He was striking a blow at the hearts of every delegate in the Pennsylvania State 
House, challenging them, implicating them in a brand of hypocrisy that certainly would have hit 
home. The agreed-upon protections for slavery were, in Martin’s view, nothing less than un-
American. 
The cogency of this salvo, accentuated by the fact that it came from a man of Martin’s profile, 
was such that it flummoxed one of the sharpest minds at the Convention. Rutledge, who became the 
second Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and claimed never to have lost a case during his 26-
year legal career, attempted weakly to refute Martin. It was, in the words of David Waldstreicher, 
“the most skilled stonewalling the convention had yet witnessed.”249 In the first place, he said the 
three-fifths ratio in no way promoted the institution of slavery, a claim belied by the self-interest that 
compelled southern states to support as much representation for slaves as possible. With personal 
slaveholdings numbering in the sixties, Rutledge went on to say that he was unconcerned about the 
prospect of slave insurrection. If this were true, it would have made him a distinct minority among 
his peers, who had spoken, written and acted for decades in ways that made plain their deep-seated 
fear of this very sort of rebellion.  
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Not only did Rutledge purport to be undaunted by the threat of slave insurrections, he claimed a 
willingness to absolve other states from any obligation to help suppress them. This, again, strains 
credulity, as it would have set him apart from many other experienced delegates – Morris, King, 
Mason, Morris among them – who spoke of such an obligation as inevitable. Months after the 
sluggish suppression of Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, the consensus among the elite was that 
federal military force could be sorely needed in the event of local or regional unrest. Public safety 
was a top priority and less than fully secure, given that nine states chose to maintain their own navy 
as of 1787.250 Such a circumstance was addressed the very next week, on August 30, when the states 
were promised national-level protection against “domestic insurrection.” This was understood to 
apply to rebellions such as Shays’, and slave uprisings as well. Rutledge was being either 
disingenuous or unrealistic with his disavowal of the want and need for federal force to be available 
in case of slave insurrection. 
Rutledge concluded his speech with something of an ultimatum, which by then had become 
fairly commonplace at the Convention amid the high stakes of latter-stage negotiations. Sidestepping 
the ideological inconsistency Martin had spotlighted, Rutledge sought to shift the focus of the 
debate. “Religion and humanity (have) nothing to do with this question… The true question at 
present is whether the Southn. States shall or shall not be parties to the Union.”251 Here Rutledge 
aggrandizes his position, subsuming the interests of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina under the 
point of view of South Carolina, which had more at stake because it had the highest percentage of 
enslaved persons in the union.252 Another way to interpret Rutledge’s remark is that he was referring 
only to South Carolina and Georgia because of their avowed willingness to draw a hard line.  
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Evidently sensing a need to sway Northern minds, Rutledge stated that allowing slavery to thrive 
would generate economic benefits outside the South. He pointed in particular to the dependence of 
the North’s shipping industry on commodities produced by Southern slaves. It is an indicator of the 
vulnerability of the South’s position that Rutledge would find it necessary to tell Northern delegates 
what was good for them, hoping they would evaluate the economic-moral equation the same way he 
did.  
The efforts of South Carolina's “most powerful and respected political figure” found a receptive 
audience.253 Lending it strength was what Christopher Collier calls a “Connecticut-South Carolina 
axis” that served as the “hinge” of the North-South coalition.”254 Ellsworth followed Rutledge’s 
speech by striking a note for state sovereignty, that each state should be able to make its own 
assessment of the “morality or wisdom of slavery.” The Connecticut jurist also amplified Rutledge’s 
point regarding the nation’s economic symbiosis: “What enriches a part enriches the whole.”255 The 
mutual enrichment would have been abundantly clear to all. An example from Rhode Island, which 
had a tiny enslaved population, is illustrative. Eight of the ten wealthiest individuals on Newport’s 
1772 tax rolls either owned slave ships or trafficked in molasses or rum, which had their origins in 
slave labor.256 The final prong of Ellsworth’s argument was that he preferred the status quo: the 
Articles of Confederation had made slavery a state matter and he wanted to keep it that way. While 
Don Fehrenbacher’s view holds that Ellsworth’s vision was intact by Convention’s end, 
Waldstreicher and Finkelman have argued that the Constitution bound the entire nation in a pro-
slavery stance. 
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Pinckney followed with what Madison recorded as the final remarks of the day. It was yet 
another ultimatum. South Carolina, the young firebrand said, would not join any union that barred 
the slave trade. This, despite the fact that at the time of Pinckney’s remarks, slave importations were 
banned in his state, along with 10 others. No matter. The South stood firm, holding fast to a 
position that conspicuously departed from the status quo. Viewed one way, this stance was 
retrograde. While the nation was moving away from slavery, this step would represent a return to the 
importations that were implicitly or explicitly legal from 1619 until 1774, when the Continental 
Congress’ Declaration of Resolves enacted an importation ban that was echoed by similar legislation 
on a colony-by-colony basis. 
Another way to look at the Southern insistence on protecting importation was that it was 
designed to nurture the future that many expected and desired. If the swell of population would flow 
to the Southwest, as was widely predicted, the original Southern colonies could enhance their own 
standing. Slave ships would arrive on the Atlantic coast, whereupon local economies would surge as 
the slaves were housed, auctioned, purchased and transported to the Southwest. 
Pinckney concluded his remarks with a startling concession. He said that if the states were left 
alone, South Carolina eventually may enact some sort of gradual abolition, as had been done in 
Virginia and Maryland.257 This seemed like a stab at appeasement. Northern delegates unable to 
make much headway on other slavery matters could be contented by the promise, however faint, of 
a future more to their liking. It is not as if they were duped into buying an unrealistic bill of goods. 
Pinckney’s suggestion was entirely credible from the perspective that the other two states he 
mentioned were largely dependent on slavery. If those states could back away from slavery – 
banning importation, legalizing private manumission - it was feasible that South Carolina could as 
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well. As Lacy Ford points out, the state legislature, with votes of assent from Rutledge and Pinckney, 
had elected in March 1787 to close the international and domestic slave trades for three years.258 
Perhaps South Carolina was genuinely willing to budge; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, for one, 
showed willingness to yield when he softened on the original fugitive slave proposal he and Butler 
submitted on August 28.259 
Sherman opened the next day’s discussions with a statement that embodied the perspective of 
many of those gathered in the Pennsylvania State House. He declared that he opposed the slave 
trade but did not see a compelling need to abolish a right the states then had.260 Broadly speaking, 
Sherman was incorrect. All states except Georgia and North Carolina, which deterred importation 
with a high import tax, had banned importation by the time of the Convention.261 Sherman then 
went onto safer ground, observing that abolition measures were taking root around the country and 
that he foresaw the ultimate completion of this progress in good time. He reiterated that he was 
devoted to his top priority – completing the Constitution – and that it trumped all other concerns. 
This, in short, explains why the South got its way on so many slavery issues. As articulated by legal 
historian William M. Wiecek, the South, with its clear and concrete demands, pushed hard on slavery 
- much harder than the North, which was divided in its slavery-related goals but unified in its desire 
to craft a Constitution to carry the nation forward.262 
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Mason followed with what is widely considered the Convention’s most notable speech on 
slavery. Just as Sherman’s address was representative in its own way, Mason’s thunderbolt presaged 
the tenor of the next several decades of abolitionist discourse. He called slavery “infernal,” argued 
that it discouraged societal progress and pointed out that it discouraged what would be a beneficial 
stream of immigration. A lifelong slaveholder, Mason went beyond condemning importation, which 
he had done before, and loosed an unbridled moral condemnation: “Every master of slaves is born a 
petty tyrant. They bring the judgment of heaven on a Country. As nations can not be rewarded or 
punished in the next world they must be in this… [P]rovidence punishes national sins, by national 
calamities.”263 Mason cast slavery in a broader light, denouncing its impact on everyone who touched 
it.264 While not as strident, Jefferson had trod similar ground several years earlier in his Notes on the 
State of Virginia. 
While taking care not to absolve Northern states enticed by “a lust of gain,” Mason also looked 
beyond the typical North-South calculus.265 He drew attention to the clamor for slavery of the 
Western states and pointed out that it would be an extraordinary boon to them to authorize South 
Carolina and Georgia to import slaves. Mason was prescient on this point, as the early 19th century 
unfolded just as he had predicted. Engaging in the question of federalism that was laced throughout 
many Convention debates, he closed by insisting that the government ought to have the power to 
prevent the expansion of slavery, an issue that would be contested for decades. 
Ellsworth, partial to Southern compromise from the beginning, then defused Mason’s attack 
with a strategic rejoinder. If the issue were to be examined through a moral lens, he suggested, 
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perhaps the best course would be to emancipate all the slaves. At this point in the Convention, such 
a proposal was doomed to get little to no traction. Instead, Ellsworth used this straw man to make 
his position seem more reasonable. Sounding very much like South Carolinians Rutledge and 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, he argued that ceasing slave importation would be unfair to South 
Carolina and Georgia because their climate and work environment did not allow natural increase the 
way that the Chesapeake states’ did. And with just as much intellectual dishonesty as his Connecticut 
colleague Sherman, Ellsworth augured that slavery was moribund – “in time (it) will not be a speck 
in our Country.”266 Judging from the lack of dissension by other delegates, it seems few were 
troubled by the logical fallacy of predicting and hoping for slavery’s demise while taking steps to 
nurture its future. This was the path chosen by the Connecticut and South Carolina delegations in 
particular. 
Both Pinckneys and Georgia’s Abraham Baldwin followed in short order, happy to find 
themselves in the unusual position of echoing an argument that a Northerner had just put forth. 
Pinckney submitted that the Southern states would end importation on their own, but that as a 
South Carolinian, he would insist on having the right to import at the moment. His older cousin 
spoke of the need to be fair to South Carolina and Georgia regarding continued imports, and like 
Rutledge reminded the assembly of the holistic economic benefits that accrued from slavery. 
Baldwin, who rarely spoke all summer, jumped in with an assertion that by now was quite familiar: 
“If left to herself, (Georgia) may probably put a stop to the evil.”267 He also advocated for state 
sovereignty on the grounds that local matters should be regulated locally – a dubious claim given the 
common understanding that slavery, which was supplied by an international trade, affected and 
indeed benefited the entire nation. 
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With a show of boldness rarely seen all summer, Wilson called the Southerners’ bluff. 
Having heard delegate after delegate predict that the Southern states would move toward banning 
importations, he asserted that their ultimata were empty threats. If they were comfortable and 
confident about the prospect of being unable to import slaves, he figured, an immediate ban would 
not be a very likely deal-breaker. Wilson – the man who had introduced the three-fifths 
compromise, the man who had valued compromise above all else for much of the summer – 
suddenly seemed to seize upon the weaknesses in the Southern position. Furthermore, he pointed 
out that as things stood, all imports but slaves were to be taxed – an exception to which he took 
exception. Although he may not have had much company among Northeners, Wilson realized just 
how much ground the North had given up to the South. Others would later reach the same 
conclusion; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, for example, boasted of the completeness of the victory 
the South achieved during the Convention’s slavery negotiations.268 
The Convention seemed stirred by the twists and turns of the day’s proceedings – a 
Southern slaveholder railing against slavery, another salvo in the debate on federalism, and an 
unexpected stance taken by Wilson, who was ranked by Clinton Rossiter as the second-most 
influential presence at the Convention.269 Dickinson, of Delaware, rebutted Baldwin’s 
characterization of slavery as a local matter and thought it “inadmissible on every principle” that 
decisions on it would not be made at the national level.270 This was an assertion echoed by New 
Hampshire’s John Langdon, a shipping entrepreneur involved in the triangular trade, later in the 
day’s debate. Indeed, as the Convention moved farther away from the state sovereignty so essential 
under the Articles of Confederation, there were many powers that the delegates already had ascribed 
to the national government – trade, some taxation matters, the coinage of money and road-building 
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among them. Allowing states to dictate their own slave policy would have been, in a sense, a 
triumph for the faction that would become the anti-Federalists - and a contradiction for the vast 
proportion of delegates who sought to empower the national government. Most would not admit to 
perceiving a contradiction. Dickinson, however, sought to shift the question to one of national 
interest. Would the national welfare be helped or hindered by slave importations? That, he said, was 
the essential question. 
Dickinson also followed Wilson in doubting the veracity of some delegates’ claim that the 
Southern states would refuse to confederate without protections against a national restriction of the 
importation of slaves – “especially as the power was not likely to be immediately exercised by the 
Genl. Government.”271 David Waldstreicher interprets Dickinson’s remarks here as calling the bluff 
of the Carolinas, in particular.272 
Gary Nash argues that Georgia and South Carolina were not in a position to make good on 
their threats to walk away from the Convention or, more to the point, to risk severing its bond with 
the union. Delegates such as Baldwin were as intransigent as any Southerners in terms of their 
ultimata: no protections for slavery would mean no support for the Constitution. This was a bluff of 
momentous consequence. 
Had Virginia or New York intimated it would not ratify, their size, strength and wealth 
would have rendered the threat considerably more viable. Conversely, as Albert Saye has pointed 
out, Georgia had a tiny white population, generated relatively little income and was “the most 
exposed” of any state. Spanish Florida lay to the south, and the Spaniards were only too happy to 
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ally with the Creek and Cherokee who predominated throughout the entirety of Georgia save for its 
easternmost flank.273    
Georgia needed the nation far more than the nation needed Georgia. Having been 
subsidized by the British crown for decades after its 1733 founding, Georgia’s dubious distinction 
under the Articles of Confederation was being the only state not to pay one cent of the federal 
requisitions.274 Madison attested to this imbalanced relationship on the eve of the Convention - “[o]f 
the affairs of Georgia I know as little as of those of Kamskatska"275 – and Washington felt even 
more strongly. Months after the unanimous vote at Georgia’s December 1787 ratification 
convention, he suggested that outcome, achieved through one day’s discussion, had been a foregone 
conclusion: "If a weak State, with powerful tribes of Indians in its rear & the Spaniards on its flank, 
do not incline to embrace a strong general Government there must, I should think, be either 
wickedness, or insanity in their conduct."276  
Georgia did embrace that strong general government, and it was clear it had no alternative. 
Its delegates had a feeble presence at the Convention, giving few speeches and fewer still of note. 
Baldwin and William Few were the only Georgians to sign the Constitution at summer’s end, as the 
other two delegates were not around. Both William Pierce and William Houston, whose own family 
was divided on the idea of Revolution in the first place, had quit Philadelphia by the end of July.277 
                                                 
273 Albert Saye, “Georgia: Security Through Union,” in The Constitution and the States: The Role of the Original 
Thirteen in the Framing and Adoption of the Federal Constitution, eds. Patrick T. Conley and John P. Kaminski (Madison, Wi.: 
Madison House Publishers, 1988), 77. 
274 Saye, “Georgia: Security Through Union,” 79. 
275 James Madison, as quoted in Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal, 15. 
276 George Washington, letter to Samuel Powell, January 18, 1788. 
277 "The Constitution of the United States: America's Founding Fathers," National Archives and Records 
Administration. Accessed June 1, 2015. 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_georgia.html.  
105 
As for South Carolina, its four-man delegation – Rutledge, the Pinckneys and Butler - made 
a far greater imprint on the Convention. Rutledge trailed only a few delegates in terms of his    
influence on the drafting process, and the other three South Carolinians were pivotal in winning the 
South concessions related to taxation and slavery. Still, outside the sanctum of the Pennsylvania 
State House, it was evident that South Carolina was not strong enough to survive on its own. 
Charles Pinckney suggested as much during the 1788 ratification convention in Charleston, when he 
echoed other delegates in referencing the state’s military weakness: “Without union with the other 
States, South Carolina must soon fall."278 Otherwise susceptible to invasion, South Carolina could 
scarcely afford not to ratify the Constitution. Yet the Northern delegates extended a degree of 
deference that radiated from their own interests, their own desire to capitalize on a southern region 
that was ripe for expansion and fortune-seeking. The Southern hard-liners were so effective that, as 
David Brion Davis has shown, the debate on slavery shifted from one of principle to one of 
concrete negotiation.279 And on those grounds, the trump card was held by anyone suggesting that 
the Convention – and the union - could fall apart. 
On that momentous day of August 22, North Carolina’s Hugh Williamson was the next to 
bluff. Despite being a moderate among Southerners for most of the summer – he conceded three 
days later he was “in opinion and in practice he was against slavery”280 – he drew a line in the sand 
alongside several others when he said Southern states would not support a Constitution that forbade 
slave importation. It was at that point that King, who echoed Wilson’s objection to allowing slave 
importations alone not to be taxed, made an assertion that proved hollow by the time the 
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Convention adjourned.281 King was as resolute as Williamson when he turned to the matter of 
utmost importance: If two Southern states rejected a Constitution with an importation ban, he said, 
there would no doubt be two Northern states that would reject a Constitution without it.282 When 
the dust in the State House had settled, however, there was no import ban, nor were there states that 
refused to confederate. All summer long, there were bluffs and threats, there were bombastic 
proclamations, there was hyperbole – all, as often as not, tactics of negotiation calculated to 
persuade the Framers’ most discerning minds.  
Then there emerged a moment of candor from Pinckney the elder. He admitted foreseeing 
nothing more than sporadic importation bans from South Carolina, repudiating the assurances of 
several Southerners.283 He would let others suggest that a moratorium on the international slave 
trade would be anything resembling permanent. Importantly, Pinckney also said he could support a 
tax on slaves equal to the tax placed on other imports. Rutledge agreed, stressing once again that the 
import ban would have been a deal-breaker for the three most Southern states.284 Then commenced 
a discussion of the propriety of import taxes, export taxes and the terms under which navigation 
treaties could be signed. Back and forth the delegates went until Randolph laid the issue bare. It was, 
he said, a choice between alienating those in non-slave states and losing the two states that vowed 
not to remain in the Union without proper protections for slavery.285 Williamson put it just the same 
way three days later.286 Evidently taking Randolph’s vow at face value, Ellsworth advocated taking 
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whatever steps necessary to prevent the 13-state confederation from crumbling. This eventuality was 
a fear common to all the delegates north and south – Ellsworth, for example, broached the 
possibility of one or several splits if certain issues remained unresolved. 
A committee on slavery was formed with one member of each state delegation. Several of 
the members were among the Convention’s most voluble on this issue – Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, Martin, Madison, Dickinson and King – in addition to Williamson, Baldwin, Langdon, 
Johnson, Clymer and Livingston.287  
Two days later, on Aug. 24, the Committee reported to the whole. The first item shared by 
Livingston was a clause banning Congress from prohibiting slave importation until 1800 but 
permitting a tax on slave importations at or below the average import tax on other goods. The 
following day, General Pinckney proposed extending the protection on slave importation until 1808 
– 20 years after the Constitution would be ratified – and was seconded by Gorham of 
Massachusetts. This was challenged in different ways by one southerner and one northerner. Said 
Madison, “Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to 
import slaves. So long a term will be more dishonorable to the National character than to say 
nothing about it in the Constitution.”288 Madison’s words were plain. A clinical calculus as to the 
reasonable window to import slaves was one thing; to baldly impugn the nation’s character was 
another. The man later dubbed the Father of the Constitution sounded a note very similar to 
Mason’s from three days prior. It was a note disregarded by most.  
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Pinckney’s proposal was passed 7-4, with dissent coming from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware and Virginia.289 Morris sought more transparency in the language of the provision and 
suggested that it specify the protection of imports into the Carolinas and Georgia, which Mason 
rightly suspected would bother the representatives of those three states. Williamson circled back to 
Randolph’s argument and emphasized the dire risk of losing states from the union. Sherman, a 
Southern ally as ever, pointed out that the restriction on the amount of the tax indicated the priority 
was to generate a bit of revenue rather than to discourage states from importing slaves. Before day’s 
end, the amount of 10 dollars per capita was agreed to.290 
On Aug. 28, the trade issue came to the forefront. During the debate on import and export 
taxes, Morris spoke up with an eye toward protecting the Western states. If the Constitution were to 
include provisions that did not acknowledge the value of the Mississippi River, Morris thought, the 
Western states would be compelled to seek support and protection from Great Britain. The fate of 
the Western states would be examined with greater depth the very next day, when Morris would 
reveal the limitations to his magnanimity toward the Western states. 
August 29 emerged as one of the most consequential days of the Convention. Before the 
delegates adjourned, they had waded through a thicket of issues – among them, the rights of 
slaveholders, sectional disputes regarding commerce, the terms of admitting new states to the union, 
the obligations of one state to honor another’s laws. 
One of the key matters resolved on August 29 was that slave interests were granted explicit 
protection and support in a way that rarely occurred throughout the summer. One day after Butler 
and Charles Pinckney advocated for its inclusion, the Butler-drafted Fugitive Slave Clause was 
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approved unanimously – once again, evading the word “slave” but stipulating that no state could 
nullify the obligations of any escaped “person bound to service or labor in any of the United States,” 
who “shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.”291 This wording of 
this provision, agreed to without any debate that was recorded or acknowledged by the delegates, 
was at once clear and opaque. 
William Wiecek has described the Fugitive Slave Clause as a concession to the south, a 
protection of slave interests, because slaveholding states otherwise would have had paltry legal 
backing in any efforts to recapture escaped slaves. Yet Akhil Amar holds that this clause presented a 
silver lining to the opponents of slavery because former slaves who had been brought by their 
masters onto free soil could reasonably be protected in being construed as something other than a 
fugitive.292 Since the clause addressed fugitives, any non-fugitive could have occupied a space outside 
its purview, with at least a chance to be viewed as a free person by the legal system. 
Like so many of the slavery-related provisions of the Constitution, the language of the clause 
was vague in that it did not specify who would carry the burden of delivering the fugitive to the 
claimant. This was a considerable problem in a historical moment when the government was widely 
understood, even among federalists like Madison, to wield only powers that were specifically 
enumerated.293 As Don Fehrenbacher points out, it was left unclear whether the federal or state 
government was obligated to honor the demands of the slaveowner. This was a gray area that 
remained muddled for decades, was frequently fought over in court, and would not gain great clarity 
until the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act requiring state officials to arrest anyone suspected of 
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being a runaway slave and penalizing civilians for aiding a runaway slave.294 But in 1787, the 
Constitution’s treatment of fugitive slaves could be interpreted as somewhat of a victory for the 
North or the South.  
Overlaying sectional differences was a sort of victory that could be appreciated by delegates 
from all regions. Empowering slaveholders to be able to recapture fugitive slaves was a salve to all 
those who feared slave insurrection. This longstanding concern, justly harbored by whites no matter 
their stance on slavery, was alleviated to some degree by at least opening the door for a mechanism 
to capture runaways.295 As Terry Lipscomb has pointed out, the Fugitive Slave Clause sucked wind 
out of the sails of those who opposed the Constitution because it went a step farther than the 
Articles of Confederation, which did not address the issue at all. Conversely, of course, the law 
bolstered the case of the Federalists. It also pushed the new nation farther away from its British 
forebears. In 1772, the seminal British case Somerset v. Stewart had yielded a ruling that denied 
slaveowners the right to recapture slaves once they had reached a territory where slavery was 
banned. This principle would be opposed by decades of American judicial interpretation up to and 
including the Dred Scott v. Sandford case of 1857 only four years before the Civil War.  
The same day as the Fugitive Slave Clause was nearly finalized – on September 15 one more 
tweak would occur, attempting to make slavery a legal question rather than a moral one - Gorham 
took a novel angle when addressing the possibility of disunion that had loomed spectrally over the 
Convention. The oldest of the four-man Massachusetts delegation, Gorham sought to strike at the 
heart of the matter. He said the Northern states had no need to confederate other than the 
economic; security against attack was not the vulnerability it was for the Southern states, who as 
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Charles Cotesworth Pinckney had admitted were weaker.296 Perhaps it was the Northern states who 
could afford to deliver an ultimatum. From this rhetorical stance, Gorham assailed the proposal - 
advocated by Charles Pinckney, Martin and others – that the passage of navigation acts would 
require a two-thirds vote. This was a pressing concern for Southerners who feared the North would 
stonewall on access to the Mississippi. 
So great were the differences within the country that Butler proposed sometime in August 
that the Constitution authorize the creation of three states united under one flag. His rationale was 
as much a hedge against an overbearing central government as it was a concession to the stark 
differences within the nation: “the Security of equal liberty and general welfare will be best preserved 
and Continued by forming the States into three Republicks [sic], distinct in their Governments but 
United by a Common League Offensive and Defensive.”297 Though the specifics of Butler’s vision 
cannot be ascertained, it is likely that he had in mind geographic delineations along the lines of the 
New England Colonies, Middle Colonies and Southern Colonies. The colonial period, which would 
have been his frame of reference, had featured scant communication or collaboration among the 
colonies. The experiences and perspectives of a cooper from Rhode Island would have had precious 
little overlap with those of a Georgia rice farmer, to the point that it was rather miraculous that the 
colonists mustered enough unanimity to stand together in overthrowing the British.  
These differences may have appeared even more pronounced with the emphasis on slavery 
around the time of the Convention. Butler’s vision for the new nation seemed a nod toward 
acknowledging and accepting the nation’s regional differences, and could have paved the way for 
clearer lines to be drawn regarding slavery in the Constitution. His proposal, however, seems not to 
                                                 
296 James Madison, “James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787: Wednesday, 
August 29.” http://context.montpelier.org/document/178#passage-3168. Accessed July 22, 2015. 
297 Pierce Butler, “The Pierce Butler Papers from the US Constitutional Convention,” Gilder Lehrman Institute 
for American History, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/collections/discoveries-from-the-vault/pierce-butler-papers-
from-us-constitutional-convention. Accessed July 1, 2015. 
112 
have made much of a ripple, as it was neither recorded nor remembered by Madison, the assiduous 
Convention scribe.298 The underlying issue did take root, however, as the delegates, allowing for a 
defection or two, on Aug. 31agreed to require no more than a nine-state majority to ratify the 
Constitution.  
Many Southern delegates had trepidation that the Northern and Middle states would pass 
laws favoring the manufacturing and mercantile interests that were much more prevalent there. They 
figured that a simple majority would be easy to come by, putting the minority of five Southern states 
at perpetual disadvantage. But due to Madison’s mitigating perspective and the South’s recognition 
of the concession they had won in being able to import slaves for at least 20 years, the delegates 
voted to drop the two-thirds requirement. This was a victory for the Northern states they were 
happy to have in exchange for acceding to Southern demands on slavery. 
The final matter to be parsed on August 29 pertained to the admission of new states to the 
union. With untrammeled ambition that would characterize the nation’s first decades, and indeed all 
of American history, the Philadelphia assemblage already was intent on the country’s growth. 
Coloring a tremendous number of the debates throughout the summer was talk of the eventualities 
and circumstances that could arise as the years unfurled; never did any delegate doubt that expansion 
would occupy a prominent place in that dreamed-about future. 
The day’s debate turned to expansion and how it would be regulated. Madison, whose 
motions were rejected with surprising frequency throughout the Convention,299 yet again found 
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himself in the minority in this instance by arguing that the Western states “neither would nor ought 
to” accede to terms that placed them on anything but an equal legal and political footing with the 
original states.300 Morris insisted that what he had in mind was not a handicap on new states but 
rather a degree of latitude for the legislature to handle expansion as it saw fit. A 9-2 vote, with only 
the Chesapeake states dissenting, proved that at least some measure of moderation tempered the 
delegates’ alacrity for expansion.301 That this was a departure from the Northwest Ordinance, which 
stipulated that that territory be divided into states that were the equal of the original 13, ultimately 
proved irrelevant. True to Morris’ vision, within four years of ratification, Congress admitted 
Vermont and Kentucky as equals and proceeded to do the same for the subsequent 35 states that 
joined the U.S. New states would have to ratify the Constitution - whose Supremacy Clause in 
Article VI ensures a certain level of uniformity and cohesiveness throughout the land - and would be 
regarded just the same as the states that had done so in 1787-89. 
In terms of their stance on expansion, the original 13 states found common ground at the 
same time as there were factors that divided them. First and foremost, they were every bit as self-
centered as could be expected of any polity. Along the path that led them to Philadelphia, they had 
weathered many storms, experienced a litany of growing pains and fought several wars – not just 
winning independence from Britain but facing a substantial number of conflicts with Native 
Americans. If the states were in a position to launch the nation anew, they had earned it. Deferring 
to new states, yielding political capital to them, bestowing economic advantages to them – none of 
this was remotely appealing to those who had toiled and sacrificed to shepherd the nation into this 
auspicious moment. 
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Yet the delegates had vision if nothing else. Routinely throughout the summer, they spoke of 
circumstances beyond that which immediately surrounded them. They spoke of population growth, 
of immigration, of potential disputes between federal and state officials, of the risk of corruption 
and greed, of the foreign affairs that might present themselves as the United States asserted itself on 
the global landscape. Wilson, the vastly influential Pennsylvanian whose Convention speeches were 
outnumbered only by Morris’, provided a broad perspective encapsulating the epochal wisdom and 
insight of the Framers.302 Just past the halfway point of the Convention, Wilson elicited no 
dissension upon declaring, “We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future 
generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment.303 This mindset was 
central to the Constitution’s success not just in the nation’s youth but has been throughout its 
history. And it helps explain why the discussions in the Pennsylvania State House so often veered 
beyond the 13 original states and into the great beyond. 
By the time of the Convention, Maine, Vermont, Kentucky and Tennessee each numbered 
into the tens of thousands of white inhabitants; all but Tennessee compared favorably to the 
populaces of Rhode Island, Georgia and Delaware. The Northwest Territory was sparsely populated 
but the framework for its growth had been established with the Ordinance of 1787. A half-dozen of 
the Convention delegates were heavily involved in land speculation; in addition, Washington himself 
had vast land holdings that included tracts in four states, plus Kentucky and the Ohio Territory. 
After the flurry of slavery-related discussion at the end of August, the Convention’s only 
other substantive matter pertaining directly to slavery was resolved on Sept. 10. With only six days 
left before the delegates would adjourn for the final time, Rutledge sought to provide additional 
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protection for the slaveholding interests, introducing a safeguard on the government’s moratorium 
on restricting slave importation before 1808. No amendments altering or affecting that moratorium 
could be passed, he proposed. The delegates signed off on this with barely a murmur.304 
On Sept. 17, the business of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania State House, as 
orchestrated by 40-odd delegates from 12 states, ceased once and for all. The arc of four months of 
discussion had spanned an enormous distance, broaching at one point or another possibilities as 
radical as an executive who would serve for life and a legislature whose members would serve for 
free. No matter, save for the name of the country, was set in stone. Just two weeks in, however, the 
three-fifths compromise was struck, setting the tone for a summer full of concessions to 
slaveholding interests that belied the leverage of the northern states and betrayed the strength of the 
antislavery movement.  
Slavery had been protected in an array of ways, leaving open the possibility that it would 
grow along with a nation that was primed and prepared to do just that. That eye toward expansion 
was central to the reason why the northern delegates opposed slavery protections with such little 
vigor. To say nothing of the political and philosophical reasons for separation, the economic 
impetus for breaking away from Britain was so strong that both North and South shared a 
commitment to maximizing the opportunities the future held. 
In the decades that followed ratification, the institution of slavery was severely constricted in 
the north, whether banned immediately or subjected to gradual abolition. It was simultaneously 
bolstered in the south - so much so that it proved impossible to extirpate without a civil war that 
would have been anathema to the Convention delegates who were focused on nothing more than 
compromise. The late 18th and early 19th centuries saw a continuation of the abolition movement, 
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but more than anything else, it was an era marked by the staggering expansion of plantation-based 
slavery in the south. This growth was centered not in the longtime slave bastion of Virginia but in 
the Deep South and new Southern states, capitalizing on full use of the Mississippi River in ways 
that exceeded even the most optimistic projections of the Revolutionary and founding generations. 
While nationwide abolition had seemed possible during the 1770s and 1780s, by the time the engine 
of cotton production had reached full bore a few decades later, the economic profile of the nation 
would brook no such thing. 
7 CONCLUSION 
Though it was not yet fully under U.S. control, the Mississippi River was at the forefront of 
the Constitution framers’ minds when they spoke of navigation matters. The Mississippi stretched 
from the far reaches of the newly organized Northwest Territory – what is now Minnesota – 
southward to the western limits of Georgia’s land claim in the present-day state of Mississippi. 
Under Spanish governance was the southernmost section, a stretch of several hundred miles that 
included New Orleans, the Mississippi Delta and access to the Gulf of Mexico.  
Unlike many other issues encountered by the young nation, the dream of expansion was one 
with scant sectional discord. Americans, whether at the Convention or not, believed their future 
should and would include a move into what was then Spanish West Florida, the only tract 
preventing the United States from unfettered access to one of the world’s mightiest rivers. The 
colonial period had evinced the commercial importance of waterways, to be sure, but that had more 
to do with the Atlantic Ocean than anything else. The Atlantic was an essential catalyst for vexatious 
British legislation such as the Boston Port Act, the Navigation Acts and the Tea Act; colonial 
economic sectors such as shipping, fishing and shipbuilding; and the Triangular Trade fueling 
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colonial lifelines to and from Europe and Africa. The centrality of water was borne out by the fact 
that the colonies’ 10 most populous cities – led by New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston and 
Baltimore – all featured coastal access. 
As the new nation gained its bearings soon after independence, the importance of waterways 
grew because Americans suddenly had to maintain, expand and regulate the economy without the 
assistance of the wealthy and long-seafaring British. Americans historically had made good use of 
rivers such as the Hudson, the Delaware, the Roanoke, the Potomac and the Savannah, each of 
which flowed 300-400 miles, sustained population centers and were a boon for both trade and 
transportation. Westward expansion made these rivers seem meager by comparison. They were 
dwarfed by the prodigious Mississippi, whose length of roughly 2,300 miles made it infinitely more 
valuable as a waterway linking several regions and providing ocean access.  
Two decades earlier, Britain had rankled the colonists by issuing the Proclamation of 1763, 
which banned them from setting west of the Appalachian Mountains. This edict on the heels of 
French and Indian War was taken as an affront by the colonists, who had helped make possible the 
British victory and acquisition of the vast expanse of land between the Appalachians and the 
Mississippi River. Independence allowed the Americans to release their pent-up ambitions, and they 
looked westward with a desirous eye. The Mississippi beckoned.  
A year prior, upon the signing of the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty, the nation came close to ceding 
access to the portion of the Lower Mississippi between Natchez and New Orleans. It was to remain 
under Spanish control for 25-30 years and would place a ceiling on the dreams of American 
prosperity in the west. This was not of major concern to the Northern states, who were enticed by 
the treaty’s provision of American access to Spanish ports abroad, but it did alarm the Southern 
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states. They had gotten a taste of such limits from 1784-86 as Spain forbade use of the port of New 
Orleans, and they did not like it. The vote on Jay-Gardoqui was 7-5, two votes shy of the nine 
required for approval by the Articles of Confederation; every state south of Delaware, which did not 
vote, rejected the treaty. 
From the Southern perspective, the future was clear. The prospects for prosperity had much 
to do with expansion and with the waterway known to the Ojibwe as Misi-ziibi, or Great River. 
Madison was bullish on the Mississippi in a 1785 letter to Lafayette: "If there be any who really look 
on the use of that river, as an object not to be sought or desired by the United States I can not but 
think they frame their policies on both very narrow and very delusive foundations."305 Without the 
Lower Mississippi, western states intending to export were relegated to transporting goods across 
the Appalachian Mountains, a long trek both difficult and dangerous. With it, however, linkages to 
European markets became much more attainable. The agricultural bounty of many states could be 
floated south on the Mississippi and then into the Gulf of Mexico, which opened up to the Atlantic 
Ocean.  
That their produce would be bountiful was beyond question. Crops like cotton and sugar 
that had grown in some southern states were identified as valuable components of the regional 
economy. Tobacco, corn and hemp had flourished in the western section of Virginia that as of 1792 
became Kentucky. Hemp was so common and so esteemed that it was permitted as a form of tax 
payment by Virginia.306 Corn also was a staple in Tennessee, which was useful as a way to feed 
families, process into whiskey and feed hogs that in turn were used for lard and other pork products. 
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As for cotton, it would not be until the 1820s that it began to thrive in West Tennessee.307 Paralleling 
the ascension of Kentucky tobacco, Tennessee cotton took a huge leap forward after farmers gained 
access to the Mississippi and its exporting capacity.  
There were other Southwestern rivers, too, that fed into the Gulf of Mexico but remained 
under Spanish control. These waterways - the Apalachicola, Tombigbee, Mobile and Pearl – were 
tantalizing in their own way and to Americans seemed destined to fall under the new nation’s 
possession.308 
Heretofore hemmed in east of the Appalachians, the Americans looked avidly to the west 
and began making plans for it as soon as they had the opportunity. Earlier in the 1780s, Virginia and 
South Carolina had ceded swaths of western lands to the federal government, just as Massachusetts 
and Connecticut did in order to make possible the Northwest Ordinance’s partition. It was obvious 
North Carolina and Georgia would be compelled to do the same, which they did, respectively, two 
and 15 years later. In the three decades after ratification of the Constitution, eight western states 
joined the union after having been carved from the original 13. States were willing to cede territory 
for the good of the whole – the ideology suffusing this era was a preference for local government 
closer to the people - but insisted on recognition of preexisting land claims by residents of the 
original states. 
So vital was the Mississippi expected to be that unsatisfactory resolution of this issue could 
have had catastrophic consequences. Catherine Drinker Bowen has suggested that there was 
concern at the Convention, especially among Southern delegates, that Kentucky and Tennessee 
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would form sovereign nations if the United States did not manage to procure access to and use of 
the river.309 And Pauline Maier argues that, given Spain’s control of the land west of the Mississippi, 
it would have targeted Kentucky for acquisition if the Constitution were not ratified, just as Britain, 
still a strong presence in Eastern Canada, may have plucked Vermont.310 Those scenarios became 
moot, but the underlying trepidation was justified. The economic promise of the southwest was so 
great that it may have enticed treachery from within. Although he was acquitted of treason, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that former Vice-President Aaron Burr mounted a plot to establish 
military control over the southwest – whose slave-based economy was by then more lucrative by the 
day - and secede from the United States. 
The Revolutionary War had had deleterious effects on the American economy, particularly 
early on in the South.311 Trade with Britain and British colonies ground to a halt, which included a 
dramatic decline in slave importations and a closing of many markets to American exports. 
Generally speaking, the instability and violence of war disrupted the rhythm and infrastructure of 
economic activity, and this hit hardest for the upper class, who were enmeshed in the global 
economy to a greater extent than were the masses. Sylvia Frey holds that these effects spurred 
whites to invest more heavily in slavery so as to rejuvenate the economy.312 Slave labor was a factor 
of production that could be amplified in order to increase the output of the agricultural sector in 
particular. 
Emerging from the tumult of the nation’s birth and struggling to find its bearings on the 
Anglo-French axis of power, the United States was hungry for economic growth. Edward Baptist 
                                                 
309 Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia, 160. 
310 Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 
68. 
311 David Brion Davis, "American Slavery and the American Revolution," in Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the 
American Revolution, eds. Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1983), 264. 
312 Frey, Water from the Rock. 
121 
provides compelling evidence that Northern speculators, shipping magnates and budding 
industrialists had a profound interest in Southern and Southwestern slavery, with financial 
involvement that nearly rivaled that of the slaveholders themselves.313 Rhode Island shipping outfits, 
for example, transported more slaves than any other state, north or south.314 Classical economic 
principles hold that capital follows opportunity. This held true during the nation’s first few decades. 
As the cotton boom resonated outward from the Deep South, its lifeblood was infused with a 
supply of capital from the north and supportive land policies by the federal government, sources 
whose spirited participation ensured the prosperity that had been envisioned in 1787 in Philadelphia.  
In the view of Walter Johnson, this process marks the slave economy as a deeply capitalistic 
one. Slavery in the Deep South could not have flourished nearly as much without the capitalistic 
confluence of banks, credit and debt, risk and reward, dynamic internal markets, linkages to external 
markets, the centrality of technology and the primacy of those who controlled the means of 
production.315 This was not an economic system whose factors of production nor beneficiaries were 
geographically constricted to the states in which slavery was legal. Just as support for slavery at the 
Constitutional Convention emanated in some ways from North and South alike, the institution’s 
geometric growth beginning in the early 19th century depended on the deep-seated involvement of 
principals from all over the United States. The result was what Sven Beckert calls “spectacular 
opportunities for profits and power,” opportunities that were on many delegates’ minds in the 
summer of 1787.316 
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The evolution of this region, primed for growth, exceeded even the proto-capitalists’ boldest 
dreams. Its ascension was exponential. In 1791, three years before Eli Whitney’s cotton gin began to 
anoint King Cotton, the entirety of the United States produced 9,000 bales of cotton. Three decades 
later, thanks to the confluence of motivated entrepreneurs, government support and an ample 
supply of slaves, Mississippi alone produced 20 million bales.317 The New South – the Deep South – 
became one of the United States’ primary economic engines, enabling the young nation to emerge as 
a substantial presence on the international stage. The mere availability of slaves was not enough to 
make this growth possible; those slaves had to be driven to generate ever higher levels of output. 
For this reason, Edward Baptist considers the torture to which the slaves were subjected a 
“factor of production.”318 What planters called the pushing system drove slaves to work harder, 
work faster, rest less and complain less. They did this at the point of the whip; overseers utilized 
“innovation in violence” to maximize the effects of physical suffering, threats and intimidation. 
Consequently, per-person productivity in the cotton fields nearly tripled from 1805 to 1825.319 
Unlike the increasing efficiencies that were supercharging the textile mills, the skyrocketing output 
among slaves had nothing to do with technology and everything to do with the effects of torture. 
It was against this backdrop of coercion and abuse that slaveholders had reason to tap into 
the fear of slave insurrection that had been extant since early in the colonial period. Running the 
gamut of views on slavery, whites ranging from Thomas Paine to George Whitfield to George 
Washington had long acknowledged the magnitude of their fears of slave insurrection. The 1790s 
stoked these fears even further as revolution in Saint-Domingue “shook many whites to their boots, 
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including some abolitionists.”320 These fears were far from idle. The 1811 German Coast rebellion in 
Louisiana; a 1816 plan in Camden, S.C.; and Denmark Vesey’s 1822 revolt in South Carolina – 
which were variously quashed inside and outside of the legal system – exemplified the types of large-
scale insurrection that compelled state legislatures in the early 19th century to pass an array of laws 
designed to prevent and punish threats to white power.  
Amid this environment, with industrialization afoot, the economy churned ever harder, and 
the importance of Southern slavery rose ever higher. It continued to rise through the 1830s, when 
William Lloyd Garrison led a revitalization of abolitionism, and the 1840s, when the first World 
Anti-Slavery Convention was held and the Ottoman Empire abolished the slave trade from Africa. It 
continued to rise through the 1850s, when anti-slavery pressure from the north peaked, thanks to 
John Brown, Frederick Douglass, Charles Sumner, Harriet Beecher Stowe and a host of others bent 
on ridding the nation of what they saw as its original sin. 
There were opponents of slavery at the Constitutional Convention as well. Some spoke up 
with vigor; others buried their principles in an effort to solidify the bonds of national union. While 
blows against slavery were commonplace in the Constitutional era, most notably with all manner of 
bans passed by state legislatures throughout the country, they were countered by the inescapable 
truth that the nation’s future would be much brighter with Southern slavery intact. Expansion into 
the Southwest, which dominated the three decades following the Convention, ensured that slavery 
was not going anywhere. The enslaved population of the United States had nearly tripled from 1787 
to 1830, and with that growth came increasing difficulty in extirpating the institution of forced labor. 
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Ten days into the Convention, Madison referred to slavery as “the most oppressive 
dominion ever exercised by man over man.”321 Surrounded by ambivalence, misgivings and 
conflicting priorities regarding slavery, he could not have known just how entrenched it would 
become. He could not have known that the ripest opportunity for abolition was there and then, 
Philadelphia 1787, and that the nation would tear itself asunder before managing to level a mortal 
blow against slavery three-quarters of a century later. 
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